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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970s, the American Medical Association, in a draft of
its principles of ethics, flatly stated: "paternalism by the profession is
no longer appropriate."' Despite this verbal sanction against doctors
"treating individuals in the way a father treats his children,"2 this
practice maintains salience in the medical profession today.
3
The paternalistic relationship between doctors and patients,
although often assumed to be gender-neutral, has specific implica-
tions for women. This Article concerns itself with how the physician's
paternal role affects women as a heterogenous, as opposed to a
homogenous, class of people.5 The paternalistic relationship between
doctors and their female patients6 has different ramifications
according to the race and socioeconomic class of the woman being
treated.
The "priestly model" of medicine7 captures well the dynamics of
this gender-specific medical relationship. This Article argues that
1. Robert M. Veatch & Ernest Tai, Talking About Death: Patterns of Lay and Profes-
sional Change, ANNAS AM. AcAD. PoI. Soc. ScL, Jan. 1980, at 38.
2. Tom L Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism, Voluntarinesr, and Comprehension, in
ETHIC. PRuNcIPLES FOR SOcIAL POLICY 123, 124-25 (John Howie ed., 1983).
3. See Beauchamp, supra note 2, at 123 ("The patient/physician relationship is essen-
tially paternalistic."); See also Allen E. Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, in
PATERNALSM 61, 63-65 (RolfSartorius ed., 1983); JAY KATz, THE SxILrN WORLD
OF DOCTOR AND PAartr (1984). While not explicitly identifying it as paternalism,
Katz says:
This book will offer contemporary and historical evidence that patients'
participation in decision making is an idea alien to the ethos of medicine.
The humane care that physicians have extended to patients throughout the
ages rarely has been based on the humaneness of consensual understanding;
rather it has been based on the humaneness of services silently rendered.
See KAa-z, supra at xvi-xvii.
4. See Beauchamp, supra note 2, at 125; see also Buchanan, supra note 3, at 63-65;
KAa-z, supra note 3, at xvi-xvii.
5. Because gender is racialized and informed by class structure and history, it cannot be
binary- "all women do not have the same gender." Elsa Barkley Brown, Polyrhythms
and Improvization: Lessons for Women's History, Hisr. WORKSHO , Spring 1991, at
85,88.
6. Unless otherwise stated, hereinafter the patient in this relationship will be assumed to
be female.
7. "The main ethical principle which summarizes [the] priestly tradition is 'Benefit and
do no harm to the patient.' ... It takes the locus of decision-making away from the
patient and places it in the hands of the professional." Robert M. Veatch, Modelsfor
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physicians' adherence to this model has a deleterious effect on
women's reproductive health as well as gender justice. Recognizing,
however, the deep historical roots of allegiance to this model,8 this
Article's primary intention is not to revolutionize doctors' attitudes
and treatments of their patients.9 Instead, the focus here is on the law.
This Article presents the case that the legal culture in many ways
undergirds the priestly model's hegemony over the therapeutic rela-
tionship between a woman and her doctor. To the extent that law
provides this fundamental support, it legitimizes the mistreatment of
women, especially with respect to their reproductive health. The im-
plications are that the movement toward a more just legal culture
necessitates the extirpation of this support.
Part I describes the priestly model, explains why it aptly charac-
terizes the doctor-patient relationship, and argues that as a
Ethical Medicine in a Revolutionary Age, in BIOMEDIcAL ErTics 55, 56 (Thomas A.
Mappes & Jane S. Zimbaty eds., 1991).
8. The Hippocratic Oath reads as follows:
I swear by Apollo Physician, Asciepis, by Health, by Panacea and by all the
gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will carry out ac-
cording to my ability and judgment, this oath and this indenture.
... I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judg-
ment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing.
Neither will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor
will I suggest such a course. Similarly I will not give to a woman a pessary
to cause abortion. I will keep pure and holy both my life and my art.
... In whatsoever houses I enter, I will enter to help the sick, and I will ab-
stain from all intentional wrongdoings and harm, especially from abusing
the bodies of man or woman, bond or free.
And whatsoever I may see or hear in the course of my profession in my in-
tercourse with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will
never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.
Now if I carry this oath, and break it not, may I gain forever reputation
among all men for my life and for my art.
Hippocrates, The Physidan's Oath, in FAmILLAR QUOTATIONS 71 (Justin Kaplan ed.,
16th ed. 1992).
9. This is not to say that such revolutionizing should not be undertaken. The achieve-
ment of dramatic changes in physicians' attitudes is not hopeless; however, in many
cases, including this one, changing the law is necessary for changing behavior. For ex-
ample, before the abolition of slavery, some slaveholders freed those whom they
enslaved. However, the wholesale reection of slavery did not come until after the law
abolishing it was passed. See generally Lea Vandervelde & Sandhya Subramanian,
Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YAlE LJ. 1033 (1997).
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consequence of the priestly model's hegemony, it reinforces negative
stereotypes of women. Part II continues to highlight the negative im-
plications of the priestly model for women, but the discussion takes a
decidedly legal turn. Specifically, it examines how laws pertaining to
sterilization, implied consent, cesarean sections, and midwifery rein-
force the unequal power relationship between doctor and patient to
the detriment of all women and especially women of color and of low
socioeconomic class. Finally, Part III will suggest legal changes that
might promote the medical community's movement away from both
the priestly model and the harmful consequences attendant to it.
I. THE HEGEMONY OF THE PRIESTLY MODEL
A. Explication of the Model
Broadly construed, the priestly model of medicine"0 is based on a
parental relationship between the physician and the lay person. The
guiding principle of this model is that the physician should benefit the
patient without doing harm. The priestly model rests on two assump-
tions. First, that a significant power and knowledge differential exists
between physician and patient. Consequently, the health care provider
is expected to make decisions for the patient," whose autonomy with
respect to decision-making is presumed to run counter to her own
personal well-being. 2 In essence, the doctor fills a parental role for the
patient.
This parental role is not gender neutral. The vast majority of higher
paid, higher status positions in the medical profession are occupied by
10. Robert M. Veatch, Director of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown Uni-
versity and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Medical School, discusses the priestly
model of medicine in his piece ModelsfirEthic Medicine in a Revolutionary Age. See
Veatch, supra note 7, at 56.
11. See, e.g., supra note 8.
12. The historical roots of societal norms against patient autonomy are deeply en-
trenched. The American Medical Association's (AMA) third edition of its Code of
Ethics, published in 1879, stipulated that patients should be submissive to their
doctors. "obedience ... to the prescriptions of [their] physician should be prompt
and implicit... [They] should never permit [their] own crude opinions to... influ-
ence [their] attention to [their physicians]." AMEICAN MEDICAL AssOcIATION CODE
ou MEDICAL ETHics, 11-12 (3d ed. 1879).
[Vol. 4:375
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men. As of 1973, just 8.3 percent of all physicians were women, 3 and by
1993 the number had increased to only nineteen percent." While there
has been an increase in medical school admissions for women in recent
years, women's numbers in the medical profession are still sparse vis-
h-vis their proportion of the entire population. Thus, the priestly
model is not only parental, but paternal. Frequently, control of the
patient's health is in the hands of the health care provider, who is
usually an upper-middle class man of European descent, and who
probably possesses the values and priorities of his gender and class. 5
As recent research suggests, the physician's paternalistic role un-
der the priestly model is one that the patient accepts, but not simply
because she has no other choice.'6 Instead, the patient herself responds
to societal expectations by endorsing the relationship with her physi-
cian. 17 In most cases, the woman recognizes the skill and knowledge
differential between herself and the physician vis-,-vis medical consid-
erations and interprets this differential as necessitating a paternalistic
role for the physician. 8 The patient believes that because the doctor
knows more, he should make all the decisions. Thus, the woman ful-
fills the model described by the AMA's Code of Ethics. 9
13. See MARYLAND PENNELL & SHIRLENE SHOWELL, WOMEN IN HEALTH CAREERS:
STATUS OF WOMEN IN HEALTH CAREERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER SE-
LECTED COUNTRIES 26 (1975).
14. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERuSTIcs AND DISTRIBu-
TION IN THE U.S. 50, 52 (1994) (reporting that 125,899 of 670,336 physicians in
1993 were women). Because males predominate not only in practice but also in the
teaching institutions, there is a high likelihood of the overall profession's being pater-
nalistic as opposed to maternalistic.
15. See Ben Gose, Womens Place in Medicine, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 3, 1995, at
49-50.
16. See SuE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT's BEST INT PR=s 6 (1986). Patients "were not too
emotional to understand complex medical explanations, nor were they too passive to
ask for needed information.... Patients believed that the doctors had information
and skills that they lacked; they believed, therefore, that the doctors should be the
ones making the medical decisions." FISHER, supra at 6.
17. See FISHER, supra note 16, at 6.
18. See FISHER, supra note 16, at 6. After spending six years in two large teaching hospi-
tals examining the manner in which doctors and patients communicate to reach
decisions, Fisher concluded that patients "believed that the doctor knew best and
would act in their best interests." FISHER, supra note 16, at 6.
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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B. The Priestly Model's Dominance
Evidence of the priestly model's applicability to physicians' atti-
tudes and actions in women's health care is abundant. The extent to
which the childbirth process is controlled by male obstetricians is one
illustration. As one resident in obstetrics and gynecology wrote "[in
the hospital] ... the doctor's word is law, and the patient's proper
attitude is submission."20 The doctor, regardless of his experience, is
considered a "fount of knowledge," and the woman is characterized as
"anxious" and "messy," and perhaps even "ashamed" and "guilty.""
Moreover, the use of the verb "deliver" as an active transitive verb, as
in "he delivered her child," places the male practitioner in the locus of
control.' The man "delivering" assumes an active role in the birthing
process while the woman is linguistically conceptualized as a passive
participant-a seeming contradiction to her physical labor.
Residents' preferred patient types provide another example of the
priestly model's hegemony. Diana Scully surveyed obstetrics and gy-
necology residents in several large hospitals and found that the
residents preferred "happy, obedient, respectful, and thankful pa-
dents."23 In addition, these residents indicated to Scully that they
preferred middle-class women with middle-class values, including a
respect for authority.24 She reported no examples of residents express-
ing a preference for inquisitive patients who want to secure active roles
in their care.25
The nature of doctor-patient communication provides great in-
sight into the power differential present in this relationship and
further demonstrates the dominance of the priestly model. In a 1993
Commonwealth Fund survey of 2,500 women, one in four said that
they had been "talked down to" by their physician,26 while one in
20. MIcHcuLL HARRISoN, AWoN IN RESIDENCE 93-94 (1982).
21. See generally, MosBy's GUIDE TO PHSCls.L EXAMINATION (Henry Seidel er al. eds.,
3d ed. 1995).
22. See generally, THE WOMEN AND LANGUAGE DEATE: A SOURCEBOOK (Camille Roman
et al. eds., 1994).
23. DIANA ScuLLY, MEN WHO CONTROL WOMEN'S HEALTH 92 (1980).
24. See ScUuLy, supra note 23, at 91-93.
25. See Sctay, supra note 23, at 91-93.
26. See LEsuE LAuRENcE & BETH WwImous, OuTAGEoUs PRnAcs: THE AIARMING
TRUTH Anour How MEDICINE MISTREATS WOMEN 331 (1994).
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five claimed that they had been told that a condition was "all in
your head."2r
A physician expects patients to provide requested information.2
While it is appropriate for patients to express uncertainty, request
clarification, and even occasionally to interrupt, physicians believe
their patients should neither disagree with their physician nor expand
or amend the topic under discussion.2 '
A final illustration of the appropriateness of the priestly model
for characterizing these doctor-patient relationships is the gynecologi-
cal examination. From the time she enters the examination room, the
patient is put in a position that heightens her childlike status with re-
spect to the doctor. Upon entering the examining room, she is usually
told to undress and is given a paper gown to put on. At the request of
a nurse, the woman patient usually lies on her back "looking at a
blank ceiling while waiting.., for him (i.e., the doctor) to enter ...
[with] no one thinking that 'meeting' a doctor for the first time in this
position is slightly odd."'
The physician's position of strength affords him the luxury of
stipulating the conditions under which the meeting will occur, often
with little regard for the patient's wishes or needs. While patients en-
ter medical interactions from a position of relative weakness,
physicians often take few or no steps in the structuring of gynecologi-
cal examinations to alleviate the discomfort of this position and, in
fact, they often exacerbate it."
The general dominance of the priestly model of medicine
reinforces negative social stereotypes of women. Physicians' belief that
women are like children is encouraged and reinforced,32 thereby
27. See LAuRNcB & WINHOUSE, supra note 26, at 331.
28. See FIsHER, supra note 16, at 80.
29. See FisHER, supra note 16, at 80.
30. Ellen Frankfort, VaginalPolitics, in SEIZING OUR BODIES 263, 266 (Claudia Dreifus
ed., 1977).
31. The most recent textbooks however, have begun to recognize the need for doctors to
modify their behavior to make women feel more comfortable. One text, for example,
tells physicians that the patient will be anxious and that the doctor should try to
make eye contact with the patient during the exam because such contact is "a hu-
manizing gesture that will not be unappreciated by the patient." The doctor is also
advised to tell the patient when he is about to start to perform the examination. See
MosBy's GUIDE TO PHysicAL ExAmINATION, supra note 21, at 542.
32. See HAUUSON, upra note 20, at 88. Recounting an incident which occurred during
her residency, the author describes a male obstetrician's angry reaction to her sugges-
tion that one would not simply provide drugs to a woman experiencing pain in labor.
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belittling women's advances and achievements. Women continue to
be associated with characteristics devalued in our culture and even
though stereotyping has declined, "women continue to be typecast as
more emotional, more passive, more excitable, and less aggressive.""
Historically, this characterization of women has been especially
prevalent in medical texts. A systematic review of the twenty-seven
most widely used medical texts published between 1943 and 1973
found a continued reinforcement of the stereotyped roles for women.
4
While reinforcement of negative conceptions of women is
deleterious to the struggle for equality, a related and perhaps more
important difficulty with the priestly model is that it greatly restricts
women's control over their own health. The harmful consequences of
this stricture on women's autonomy and self-expression with respect
to care for their health will be developed in subsequent sections. As
this Article will argue, a primary force in the structure is the law's
reinforcement of the priestly model of medicine.
II. LEGAL SUPPORT FOR THE PRIESTLY MODEL
A. Sterilization
Although both men and women can and, in fact, do undergo
sterilization, statistics show this method of contraception is strongly
associated with women. About one million people are sterilized every
year, and of those, two-thirds are women." The gender disparity in
sterilization rates, however, is not necessarily a sign that women's
mates and doctors treat them unfairly. Arguably, the choice to un-
dergo sterilization is a manifestation of a woman's more general
33. FIsHER, supra note 16, at 157.
34. See Diana Scully & Pauline Best, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Orifice:
Women in Gynecology Textbooks, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1045, 1045 (1973). There have been
no recent systematic studies since this one. The medical profession is still dominated,
however, by'physicians trained with the same texts referred to in this study. See HAR-
RiSON, supra note 20, at 250 (critiquing the current system, Dr. Michelle Harrison
wrote, "Physicians are trained and conditioned to see their patients as objects to be as-
sembled and reassembled once they enter the system. If you are sick, or even if you
are having a baby, you are presumed to be incapable of intelligent judgment, and
therefore under the control of experts.").
35. See Lynn Smith, For Millions, Sterilization is the Answer-But Regrets Are Not Un-
common, LA. Trmbs, Jan. 6, 1993, at A12.
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decision to seize control of her body and her reproductive future, an
effective counter to portrayals of her gender as "passive."36
This interpretation becomes somewhat problematic when ex-
tended beyond theory. Figures reported in a 1993 Senate hearing on
hysterectomies indicate that between twenty-four and thirty percent of
all hysterectomies are "unnecessary." 7 While forty percent of women
in the United States undergo hysterectomies by the age of sixty, the
Swedish rate is just ten percent.38 The Swedish statistic supports the
U.S. Senate conclusion that many hysterectomies are unnecessary.
The high rate at which women undergo unnecessary operations
on the advice of their doctors is troublesome for several reasons. First,
hysterectomies are not operations performed without risk. In addition
to the incidence of death subsequent to this surgical procedure,
estimates suggest that nonfatal complications occur in somewhere
between twenty-five to fifty percent of the cases; long term effects of
hysterectomies may include premature ovarian failure, persistent
pelvic pain, and depression.' Second, arguably, hysterectomies are
objectionable because they make a mockery of women's autonomy.
One might assume few women would undergo major surgery such as a
hysterectomy unless they think it necessary. Thus, to the extent that
physicians may deceive or misinform women with respect to this
36. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of women's character
as passive.
37. Unnecessary Hysterectomies, The Second Most Common Major Surgey in the United
States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Hu-
man Resources, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter, Hysterectomy Hearings]. Although
"unnecessary" was not explicitly defined by Congress, the hearing 'referred to inap-
propriate reasons for hysterectomies:
Hysterectomy is rarely appropriate for chronic pelvic pain or pelvic con-
gestion syndrome. Hysterectomy should not be performed as prophylaxis
against cancer, for contraception in a gynecologically normal patient, for
management of the menopause, for chronic cervicitis, for primary dys-
menorrhea, for premenstrual tension, for mild urinary incontinence, for
a single episode of postmenopausal bleeding, for an abnormal Pap smear
report, or for mild or moderate cervical dysplasia. Practitioners some-
times attempt to justify hysterectomy by combining several
inappropriate indications, any one of which would not justify the hyster-
ectomy alone. Combining inappropriate indications to justify
hysterectomy does not constitute appropriate practice. Instead, each in-
dication should be treated individually.
Hysterectomy Hearings, supra at 109.
38. See Hysterectomy Hearings, supra note 37, at 83.
39. See Hysterectomy Hearings, supra note 37, at 26.
19971
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decision, a wbman's choice in a practical sense is a quasi-choice at best
and a non-choice at worst.
The rate of unnecessary hysterectomies is also troublesome
because of the manner in which racial considerations appear to
influence doctors' paternalistic decisions. Areas in the South with
large populations of African-American women have the highest rates
of hysterectomies in the nation.40 Data analysis of hospital discharge
records affirms the correlation between race and hysterectomy rates
suggested by the regional disparities.4' Even more disturbingly, recent
research links hysterectomies for African-American women with
higher postsurgery complication rates, including death.42
The history of sterilization in the United States prompts us to
consider the role played by racial and class biases in not only physi-
cians' paternalistic medical decisions but in their legal judgments as
40. See ROBERT PoxtAs, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERv., PUB, No. 85-1753,
HYSTERECTOMIES m THE UNrTED STATES, 1965-84, 19 (1987) (reporting data from
the National Health Survey indicating that among women age 15-44, the hysterec-
tomy rate was 10.0 per 1000 women in the South in 1984, while it was 3.8, 6.7, and
7.9 in the Northeast, North Central, and West regions respectively); see aso Char-
lotte Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE J.L &
FEmainsM 255, 274 (1992).
41. See Lynne S. Wilco)F et al., Hysterectomy in the United States, 1988-1990, 83 On-
s-rEnTcs & GYNECOLOGY 549, 551- (1994) (using 1988 to 1990 data from National
Hospital Discharge Survey and conduding that hysterectomy rates were 61.7 per
10,000 for African-American-women compared to 56.5 for white women); see also
Kristen H. Kjerulff et al., Hysterectomy and Race, 82 OBsTmcs & GYNECOLOGY
757, 762-64 (1993) (analyzing discharge summary data for 53,159 hysterectomies
that occurred in Maryland between 1986 and 1991 and concluding that the hyster-
ectomy rate for African-American women was 49.5 per 10,000 while that for white
women was 41.2 per 10,000).
42. See Kjerulffet al., supra note 41, at 761-62 (reporting that African-American women
were at a higher risk of one or more postsurgical complications relative to white
women and that African-American women had more than three times the in-hospital
mortality rate of white women); see also Theresa Wilz, Hysterectomy Hysteria, Es-
sENCF, Oct. 1992, at 24 (citing a University of Maryland at Baltimore Medical
School study concluding that African-American women, compared to white women,
are more than two times as likely to die from hysterectomy procedures).
It should be noted that higher rates of some diseases among African-American
women might account for the ethnic disparities in both hysterectomy operation and
complication rates. See Wilcox, supra note 41, at 532 (reporting that the primary di-
agnosis for 61% of African-American women, receiving hysterectomies in the data
sample was uterine leiomyoma, or "fibroid tumor," while the same figure was just
29% for white women). See also Kjerulff et al., supra note 41, at 760 (reporting that
the primary diagnosis was uterine fibroids for 65.4% of African-American women
and 28.5% for white women).
[Vol. 4:375
THE PRIESTLY MODEL OF MEDICINE
well. Contrary to the celebratory hypothesis that sterilization is strictly
a manifestation of a woman's exercising her autonomy, Robert Blank
argues that at the turn of the century social control was the basis for
interest in sterilization in the United States.43 Law and medicine inter-
sected, as "medical theories postulating that mental illness was
inherited and by social elitist theories stemming from Darwinism" led
to legislation."
Indiana adopted the nation's first sterilization statute in 1907.4'
Between 1907 and 1964, at least 63,000 people were sterilized in the
United States under similar laws legalizing sterilization. 46 One esti-
mate reports that over half of these sterilizations were done to persons
classified as mentally retarded. 47 As of 1961, state law in twenty-six
states made involuntary eugenic sterilization legally possible.4 Having
passed through a good part of the Civil Rights Era, sixteen states still
had such laws on the books in 1972,4' and many retained them
throughout the 1970s.50
Oftentimes, it was poor women and women of color, two groups
that often overlap, who suffered most, usually at the hands of public
assistance officials. 5' These officials reportedly "tricked ... [African-
American] welfare recipients into consenting to sterilization of their
teenage daughters." 52 In North Carolina alone, more than 7,500
women were sterilized for what was alleged to be mental retardation
from 1933 through 1974, and 5,000 of them were African-
Americans. 3 As of 1973, more than forty percent of women sterilized
43. See ROBERT H. BLANK, FERTILITr CONTROL: NEw TECHNIQUES, Naw POLICY IssuES
57 (1991).
44. BLANK, supra note 43, at 57.
45. See Dan L Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perpective, 30
Hous. L REv. 1597, 1645 n.367 (1993) (citing J.H. Landman, The Human Sterili-
zation Movement, 24 J. CriM. L & CiuMINoLoGY 400, 403 (1933)).
46. See JoNAs ROBrrscHER, EUGENIC STERILIZATION apps. at 118-19, 123 (1973); see
alo Helen Rodrigues-Triaz, Sterilization Abuse, in BIOLOGICAL WOMAN: THE CON-
VENIENT MYnH 147, 148 (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds., 1982).
47. See RoBrrsCHER, supra note 46, app. at 123 (illustrating that 33,374, or 52.4%, of
forced sterilization patients were labeled mentally retarded).
48. See PHILuP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SoLUION: A HISTORY oF INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 148 (1991).
49. See GENA COREA, THE HIDDEN MALPRACnCES: How AMEUCAN MEDICINE TaREATS
WOMEN AS PATrrNTs AND PRomFsslONAts 128 (1977).
50. See CoPnA, supra note 49, at 128.
51. SeeNancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization ofthe Womb, 43 DUKE Lj. 492 (1993).
52. Rutherford, supra note 40, at 273.
53. See ANGELA Y. DAvis, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLAss 217 (1981).
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in federally financed "family programs" were African-American.54 Ad-
ditionally, many "Native American women, under twenty-one years of
age, were subjected to radical hysterectomies and informed consent
procedures were ignored.""5 In 1976, twenty-four percent of Native
American women of childbearing age had been sterilized.5" A law
journal article at the time reported that "[t]he overall increase in sur-
gical sterilizations has taken place disproportionately by sex, race,
Class, and age.
"57
Statistics from the 1980s suggest that this has continued. In
1982, while just fifteen percent of European-American women had
undergone sterilization, the same was true for twenty-four percent of
African-Americans, thirty-five percent of Puerto Ricans, and forty-two
*percent of Native Americans." In 1985, the Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights reported that sterilization rates were forty-nine
percent higher for women on welfare."9
Throughout this legacy of legislatively permitted sterilization, the
judiciary has played an integral role. Twenty years after Indiana adopted
the nation's first sterilization statute in 1907,' the Supreme Court first
addressed the issue. In Buck v. Bell,6' the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of Virginia's statute permitting involuntary sterilization.62 Fifteen
54. See Rodrigues-Triaz, supra note 46, at 149 (citing survey research on women in feder-
ally funded family planning programs in 1972); Denton Vaughan & Gerald Sparer,
Ethnic Group and Welfare Status of Women Sterilized in Federally Funded Family
PlanningPrograms--1972, 6 Fxm. PLAN. PERsn. 224 (1974).
55. Rutherford, supra note 40, at 273; see also Rodrigues-Triaz, supra note 46, at 147.
56. See DAvis, supra note 53, at 218 (citing testimony by Dr. Connie Uri at a Senate
committee hearing).
57. Dick Grosboll, Sterilization Abuse: Current State of Law and Remedies for Abuse, 10
GOLDEN GATE U. L Rav. 1147, 1153 (1980); see also Activities of the Indian Health
Service, General Accounting Office, HRD-77-3 (1976) (finding that there had been
3,000 female sterilizations performed over a four-year period in federally funded In-
dian Health Service facilities using consent forms not in compliance with the federal
regulations).
58. See Rutherford, supra note 40, at 273-74 (citing Vicki Alexander, Black Women and
Health, 6 CHoxcas 6, 16 (1986)).
59. See BLANK, upra note 43, at 65.
60. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
61. Buckv. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
62. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 208. In denying that a compulsory sterilization of Carrie Buck,
"a feeble minded white woman," violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Justice Holmes offered a seemingly utilitarian perspective in his
derogation of the mentally handicapped:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
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years later, in 1942, the Court placed the first limitations on steriliza-
tion in Skinner v. Oklahoma.63
More recently, the courts have played a more indirect role in
supporting the sterilization of women against their will. Currently,
five states have legislation permitting involuntary sterilization." Until
1980, such statutes were generally a necessary condition for court-
ordered sterilizations.6 5 However, such statutes are not always essen-
tial. Because of a series of state supreme court decisions in the 1980s,6
the lower courts of general jurisdiction in eight additional states can
now decide sterilization petitions even in the absence of an express
grant of power to do so by the legislature.67 Thus, court ordered ster-
ilizations that supplement physician paternalism and further weaken
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices.. . in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.
Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added).
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (arguing that the Oklahoma stat-
ute's unequal treatment of similar crimes such as theft and embezzlement, where the
former could be punished with sterilization and the latter could not, was unaccept-
able because of the gravity of sterilization as a punishment). In delivering the opinion
of the Court, however, Justice Douglas distinguished the judgment in Buck v. Belh
and left the door open for compulsory sterilization. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538.
64. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5716 (1995) (permitting involuntary steriliza-
tion); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to 39-3910 (1993) (permitting involuntary
sterilization); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-3 to 41-45-19 (1996) (permitting sterili-
zation of patients and inmates at state mental hospitals when it is in the best interests
of the patient and society); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to 35-50 (1990) (permitting
sterilization of mentally ill or mentally retarded persons); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1
to 27-16-5 (1992) (allowing sterilization of the mentally incompetent upon consent
and court approval).
65. See BLUNK, supra note 43, at 69 ("Until 1980, with very few exceptions ... the vast
majority of courts ruled that they had no authorization to order permanent steriliza-
tion of incompetents without an express legislative grant of such power .....
66. See BLANw, supra note 43, at 68. Blank states that a 1978 Supreme Court decision
holding that "a judge who exceeds his authority and orders a sterilization without a
proper legal basis for doing so enjoys judicial immunity from any future suits for
damages" paved the way for these state supreme court decisions. BL.AN, supra note
43, at 71 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)). Blank notes that while
there is no uniform response from the courts on the issue of whether in the absence
of express statutory authority the courts have equitable jurisdiction to approve sterili-
zation petitions for incompetent persons, a move toward allowing such orders, within
strict parameters, is growing. See BLt-.., supra note 43, at 68.
67. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo.
1981); In re Guardianship of Matejski, 419 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1988); In re Moe,
432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982); In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541 (N.H. 1980); In re
Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981); Id re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635
(Wash. 1980).
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women's autonomy with respect to reproductive control are permitted
in twelve, or nearly one-quarter, of the nation's states.68
Court-ordered sterilizations in most of these states are legal only
in cases where the woman is mentally incompetent.69 This restriction,
however, does not make this legal endorsement of medical paternalism
any more acceptable. First, there are many reasons that extend beyond
the scope of this Article why sterilization of the mentally incompetent
is problematic." Second, a concern encompassing all women emerges
when we assume that there is a clear demarcation as opposed to a con-
tinuum between the mentally competent and the mentally
incompetent. According to Blank, only five percent of all mentally
retarded persons lack the capacity to comprehend reproduction, and
only six percent are "moderately retarded."7 ' At the same time, a vast
majority of all retarded persons are classified as "mildly retarded,"
which is "often only a fractional deviation from the norm."'72 Given
the arbitrary nature of "the norm," even those who endorse the forced
sterilization of the mentally incompetent might need to reconsider
their endorsement of any particular sterilization. Regardless of
whether or not the forced sterilization of women who are judged
mentally incompetent is ethical, the indistinct lines separating com-
petence and incompetence means that a great proportion of women
live under the shadow of the possibility of forced sterilization. To
paraphrase Martin Luther King in a slightly modified form: in the
case of the forced sterilization of women, injustice anywhere is poten-
tial injustice everywhere. 73
68. I arrived at this figure simply by adding together the number of states permitting
compulsory sterilization statutorily (five) and those who permit sterilization through
state supreme court decisions (seven). It should be noted that the furthest extensions
of the federal government into these laws was legislation enacted in 1979 that pro-
hibited federal funding for sterilization of persons under 21, as well as those
institutionalized and/or adjudicated incompetent. See BLANc, supra note 43, at 64.
69. See supra note 64. Only in Idaho and Delaware can compulsory sterilization extend
beyond the mentally incompetent.
70. See e.g., Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization ofMentally Disabled Women, 8 BER-
ICELE WOMEN'S L.J. 122, 163 (1993) (arguing that the court ordered sterilization of
a mentally incompetent woman "overemphasizes the interests of others and trivializes
or ignores the individual's interest in non-intrusion").
71. BLANK, supra note 43, at 79.
72. BLwAN, supra note 43, at 74. 89% of all persons who are mentally retarded are classi-
fied in this manner. See BxN, supra note 43, at 79.
73.. JoAN MonusoN & CHARLaz= Fox, AMERICAN MosAIc 439 (1980) ("Injustice any-
where is a threat to justice everywhere.").
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As the earlier discussion of unnecessary hysterectomies might
suggest,7' just as the lines between competent and incompetent are
blurred if not indistinguishable, so too are those between voluntary
and involuntary sterilization. Literature from and about the 1970s
demonstrates this point most strongly. Some physicians conditioned
the delivery of babies and the performance of abortion on obtaining
consent to sterilization." State Medicaid programs helped these
physicians accomplish their agendas by providing funding for
sterilization, while doing nothing to provide information about other
forms of birth control. 76
At least one federal court also gave these physicians the necessary
support. In Walker v. Pierce,7 the plaintiff filed suit against her physi-
cian for his refusal to assist in giving birth to her child except on the
condition that she be sterilized.78 During the court proceedings, Dr.
Pierce made no attempt to deny Walker's allegations and, in fact,
stated that subjecting the delivery of children to such conditions in the
case of poor women was his normal policy.79 After hearing the oppos-
ing parties' arguments, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the lower court's judgment against Dr. Pierce. 0
74. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
75. See Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women,
in RnPRODUCrIvn LAWS FOR m 1990's 23, 46 (Nadine Taub & Sherrill Cohen eds.,
1989).
76. See Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 75, at 47.
77. Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977).
78. As explained in the case, Virgil Walker sought Dr. Pierce's assistance upon learning
that she would give birth to her fourth child. Dr. Pierce told Ms. Walker that he
would assist her only if she agreed to be sterilized subsequent to giving birth. After
much resistance, Ms. Walker consented. See Walker, 560 F.2d at 611.
79. See Walker, 560 F.2d at 611. Dr. Pierce flatly stated:
My policy was with people who were unable to financially support them-
selves, whether they be on Medicaid or just unable to pay their own bills, if
they were having a third child, to request they voluntarily submit to sterili-
zation following the delivery of the third child. If they did not wish this as
a condition for my care, then I requested that they seek another physician
other than myself.
Waker, 560 F.2d at 611.
80. See Walker, 560 F.2d at 613. The court stated, "We perceive no reason why Dr.
Pierce could not eitablish and pursue the policy he has publicly and freely an-
nounced. Nor are we cited to judicial precedent or statute inhibiting this personal
economic philosophy." Waker, 560 F.2d at 613. The court's reversal here was not
monumental; the jury fined him a mere five dollars and the district court denied de-
claratory and injunctive relief. See Walker, 560 F.2d at 610-11.
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Seeking a woman's consent to sterilization extended into the la-
bor room as well. One researcher has described how young women in
Los Angeles County, often African-American or Latina, were con-
vinced to sign consent forms for tubal ligations while in labor."' These
patients were frightened, in pain, and often under the influence of
medication! 2 An intern at Wayne State Medical School in Detroit
corroborates the stories from Los Angeles:
Most of our patient population was black, inner-city.... We
had a lot of young girls come in ... thirteen and sixteen and
they'd have two or three children. In those cases, we'd ask
them, often when they were in labor, if they wanted tubal
ligations. There were so many young girls and most of them
had a real low mentality. We'd tell them about birth control
and they wouldn't take it. It would get some of the residents
really mad.83
This practice of securing consent from a woman who is in labor
is analogous to a policeman obtaining a confession from a suspected
criminal under duress. In both cases, a person in authority, whether he
be an investigator or a physician, takes advantage of an individual in a
position of relative weakness, rendering the "voluntariness" of that
individual's utterings suspect.U For a woman's consent to sterilization
81. See BARBAR SEAMN & GmEON SEAMNm, WomE mnD um CmisIs i Sax HoRmoN=S
229-30 (1977); Claudia Dreifuis, Swtilizing the Poor, in SizEIMG OuR BODIES 105, 113
(Claudia Dreifis eL, 1977).
82. See Dreifuis, supra note 81, at 110-11.
83. Dreifs, supra note 81, at 113.
84. One might also construe physicians' actions in these cases as taking advantage of the
Odysseus problem seemingly common to all human beings, in order to promote their
own economic and reproductive agenda. In Greek mythology, Odysseus wanted to
sail around the Island of the Sirens; however, he knew the fate of sailors before him-
upon hearing the mellifluous singing of the Island's nymphs, they crashed their ships
headlong into the rocks in an effort to reach its source. The sailors' immediate cir-
cumstances precluded their acting in their long-term interests. To circumvent this
problem, Odysseus had his men tie him to the mast of the ship so that he might both
hear the singing and survive. Upon hearing the Sirens, Odysseus pleaded with his
men to untie him, but, consistent with his earlier orders, they did not.
Unfortunately, in the case of poor women and women of color in labor, doctors
are not so loyal as Odysseus' sailors. While undergoing childbirth, a woman
experiences a great deal of pain. The woman might be pained to such an extent that
she believes she never wants to have a similar experience, even though this immediate
belief may be contrary to her wishes outside of the childbirth experience. Instead of
looking out for the woman's long term interests, the doctor takes the opportunity to
advance his own racist and dassist agenda and "unties the woman from the mast" by
performing a tubal ligation.
[Vol. 4:375
THE PRIESTLY MODEL OF MEDICINE
to be considered voluntary (and thus acceptable) it must be informed.
To meet the criteria for autonomous decision-making, she must be
given all relevant information about her options and adequate time to
contemplate the alternatives, while in a state of mind capable of un-
derstanding and evaluating the complexities of her situation.8 The
next section argues that most informed consent laws do not promote
the existence of these conditions.
B. Informed Consent
1. Often Uninformed "Informed Consent"
One does not need to go into labor rooms and witness doctors
obtaining permission to do a sterilization from a woman under ex-
treme physical and emotional strain to find the efficacy of informed
consent laws lacking. One incident involved women who were part of
an experiment which necessitated multiple amniocentesis procedures. 86
Even though these women spoke and read very little English, their
"consent" was obtained by having them sign a three page consent
form written in college-level English."
The case of Puerto Rican women in the New York City area pro-
vides another more substantial, if somewhat ambiguous example. In
conducting an ethnographic study of a predominantly Puerto Rican
neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York, Iris Lopez found that of those
households in which one or more Puerto Rican women over the age of
twenty lived, forty-seven percent sheltered one or more sterilized
women, ninety-three percent of whom were born in Puerto Rico but
sterilized in the United States while between the ages of seventeen and
88
twenty-one.
85. See Howard Brady, Transparency: Informed Consent in Primary Care, H GS CEN-
TEit REP., Sepr.-Oct. 1989, at 5, 5-9.
86. See Karen Marie Perrin, Infbrmed Consent. A Challenge for Patient Advocacy, in ETrn-
CAL DILEMMAS IN CoNTEMPoRARY NURSING PRaCTIcE 105-106 (Gladys B. White
ed., 1992).
87. See Perrin, supra note 86, at 106.
88. See Iris Lopez, Agency and Constraint: Sterilization and Reproductive Freedom Among
Puerto Rican Women in New York City, 22 URw. ANTHROPOLOGY & STUD. CULTURAL
Sys. & WoRLD ECON. Day. 299, 303 (1993). Notably, these women were not afflu-
ent. Seventy percent of them received some form of Aid to Dependent Children. See
Lopez, supra at 310.
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This Brooklyn neighborhood is not an anomaly in New York
City. The overall sterilization rate for Puerto Rican women in this city
stands at 31.4 percent, more than seventeen points higher than the
national rate.' Considering the earlier discussion of doctors' obtaining
sterilization consent from women who are in labor,"° figures like these
can be very disturbing. There are alternative explanations for these
statistics, however. As Lopez points out, a woman's decision to be
sterilized is often influenced by socioeconomic pressures and reali-
ties.9' Indeed, four out of five women in the Lopez study cited
economic circumstances as having either direcdy or indirectly influ-
enced their decision to be sterilized.92
Putting aside the argument that economic conditions give Puerto
Rican women no "real" choice in the matter, sterilization decisions by
Puerto Rican women may be a manifestation of an exercise of agency
on their part. Such an interpretation exonerates both the medical
community and the legal system of any fault.
At the same time, other evidence strongly suggests that a personal
choice model is an incomplete, if not altogether wrong, tool for
interpreting these sterilization decisions. In support of this argument
Lopez points to the Hyde Amendment of 1977," which prohibits
funding for abortions for women on Medicaid while making
sterilizations "readily available."" This policy could have given women
in the Lopez study the impression that sterilization was their only
feasible option in controlling reproduction. Indeed, a large number of
these women did not know about alternative birth control methods
such as the diaphragm. 9" Moreover, not only did the women lack
information about birth control, there was also important
misinformation about the sterilization imparted to them by the
medical community. Such deceptive phrases as "band-aid
sterilization" and "bikini cut" are common references made to the
procedure in hospitals;96 these mislabellings are of no small
89. See Joseph J. Salvo et al., Contraceptive Use and Sterilization Among Puerto Rican
Women, 24 Fm. PLANNING PERPsp. 219, 220 (1992). The authors based these figures
on a survey of Puerto Rican women living in the New York area.
90. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
91. SeeLopez, supranote 88, at311.
92. See Lopez. supra note 88, at 311.
93. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L No. 95-205, 91 Star. 1460 (1977).
94. See Lopez supra note 88, at 307.
95. See Lopez, supra note 88, at 305.
96. Lopez, supra note 88, at 316.
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consequence. Among the women, there was a salient distinction
between "tying" and "cutting" the fallopian tubes, the former being
temporary and the latter permanent.9 One woman explained, "I feel
that if a woman is not sure if she wants anymore kids, then she should
have her tubes tied. If a woman has decided she absolutely does not
want to have more children, then she should have her tubes 'cut."' ,
Of the sterilized women in the Brooklyn neighborhood surveyed,
thirty-three percent regretted their decision, and while another forty-
six percent did not regret their decision,- they were not happy with it
either.99 These high rates of dissatisfaction, along with the earlier de-
scribed experimentation performed on foreign-born women, 10 attest
to the importance of fully informing women about the procedure that
doctors wish to perform on them. Legal safeguards do not appear to
be affecting this outcome. We will now turn to why this inefficacy
might be the case.
2. Remedy? A History and Criticism of the
Reasonable Physician Standard
Unlike the case of forced sterilizations, there are no laws that
sanction the medical community's gaining "coerced" consent to ster-
ilization from low-income women or women of color. Nor are there
enabling statutes that permit doctors to misinform or fail to inform
women about medical procedures in order to gain their consent.
However, the legal guidelines for obtaining informed consent in sev-
eral states, which favor the reasonable physician standard,' not only
97. Lopez, supra note 88, at 316.
98. Lopez, supra note 88, at 316. Lopez found that although there was not in reality a
distinction, the women believed there to be one. Those women who did not want to
be permanently sterilized therefore chose to have their tubes "tied" since they incor-
rectly believed that to "tie" was a less permanent solution than to "Cut." The women
believed that the doctor could simply untie tubes that were tied, but could not restore
fertility once the tubes had been cut. See Lopez, supra note 86, at 316.
99. See Lopez, supra note 88, at 316.
100. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
101. See Amz. Rnv. STAT. § 12-563 (1992 & Supp. 1996)(stating the "necessary elements
of proof" for medical malpractice claims generally and confirming the reasonable
physician standard); IDAHO CODE § 39-4304 (1993)(establishing an objective medi-
cal community standard for informed consent cases); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 44-2816
(1993)(defining informed consent in terms of the "reasonably prudent health care
provider"); N.D. CEr. CODE § 26.1-14 (1992)(dealing with medical malpractice
insurance generally); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(2)(d) (1996)(stating that a physi-
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perpetuate medical paternalism in women's health care, but also make
a doctor's failure to gain consent difficult to prove in a court of law.
The reasonable physician standard thereby reinforces the priestly
model of medicine to the detriment of both women's health and
autonomy.
Taken together, Salgo v. Leland"02 in 1957 and Natanson v.
Kline'03 in 1960 formulated the informed consent law and the
reasonable physician standard respectively. In Salgo v. Leland, the
plaintiff Salgo filed a malpractice suit alleging that his physician was
Inegligent in performing an aortography, resulting in his paraplegia.'°
During the trial, Salgo testified that he was not informed that an
aortography would be performed while he was anesthetized."'
Addressing this alleged failure to disclose on the part of the physician,
the court stipulated two instances in which a physician violates his
duty to a patient: 1) "if he withholds any facts which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
dan's use of "reasonable discretion," after "considering all the attendant facts and cir-
cumstances," is a defense to a malpractice suit based on a lack of informed consent);
Rushv. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1981); Dessi v. United States, 489 F. Supp.
722, 727-28 (E.D. Va. 1980); Dewes v. Indian Health Serv., 504 F. Supp. 203,
206-07 (D.S.D. 1980); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89-90 (Ark. 1980); Rob-
inson v. Mroz, 433 A.2d 1051, 1055-56 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Buckner v.
Allergan Pharms., Inc., 400 So. 2d 820, 823-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); LePelley
v. Grefenson, 614 P.2d 962, 969 (Idaho 1980); Searcy v. Manganhas, 415 N.E.2d
142, 144-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan.
1960); Rice v. Jaskolski, 313 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1981); Cress v. Mayer, 626
S.W.2d 430, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Colin v. Itoh, 503 P.2d 36, 40-41 (Mont.
1972); Folger v. Corbett, 394 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1978); Davis v. Caldwell, 429 N.E.2d
741, 744-45 (N.Y. 1981); McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 895 (N.C. 1982);
Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, 262 N.W.2d 508, 511-12 (S.D. 1978); Roark v.
Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 808-09 (Tex. 1982). In Utah, there have been conflicting
decisions. Compare Ficklin v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Utah
1976)(holding in favor of a reasonable physician standard), with Nixdorf v. Hicken
612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980)(holding in favor of a reasonable patient standard).
See also Susan Oliver Renfer et al., The Woman's Right to Know: A Model Approach to
the Informed Consent ofAbortion, 22 Loy. U. CHi. LJ. 409 (1991) (naming and ex-
plaining the "reasonable physician's" standard).
102. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957).
103. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
104. See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 174-75.
105. See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
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treatment " 1°6 and 2) if he "minimize[s] the known dangers of a
procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent.
" 1°7
Although this judgment seems prima facie to be a boon to pa-
tients' autonomy, that was not the effect for at least two reasons. First,
after giving the guiding stipulations, the court made a qualification
that seems tantamount to an about-face. Concerned that complete
disclosure might actually end up harming the patient,"8 Salgo holds
that part of a doctor's proper duty was as follows:
[t]o recognize that each patient presents a separate problem,
that the patient's mental and emotional condition is impor-
tant and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing
the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be
employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary
to an informed consent.109
Not only is this qualification ambiguous-the court says the phy-
sician should use "discretion" in providing "full disclosure"-" 0 it also
illustrates the extent to which the legal system defers to physicians.
The court assumes that the physician, who is not trained in psychol-
ogy or psychiatry but in maintaining the physical well-being of
patients, has the ability to judge properly the "mental and emotional
condition" of his patients. Thus, he may use "a certain amount of dis-
cretion" in informing the patient about the procedure.' Not only is
this assumption deferential, it endorses the doctor's paternalism as
well, He can decide what is okay for her to hear.
Three years after Salgo v. Leland was decided, a Kansas court
seemed none too concerned with this rather gratuitous granting of
psychological wisdom to physicians." 2 Notwithstanding that the in-
formed consent doctrine outlined in Salgo v. Leland simply comprised
106. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
107. Sdlg, 317 P.2d at 181.
108. See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181 (stating that informing the patient of all risks associated
with a procedure "may well result in alarming a patient who is already unduly
apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in
fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks by reason of the
physiological results of the apprehension itself').
109. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
110. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
111. Salgo 317 P.2d at 181.
112. See Natamon, 350 P.2d at 1093.
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the jury instructions,"3 it was nonetheless followed in Natanson v.
Kline."4 The court in Natanson, finding in favor of a woman who al-
leged that she was not informed of the risks attendant to cobalt
treatment, quoted the earlier case extensively."' However, the latter
court made one additional stipulation regarding the manner in which
the appropriateness of disclosure should be judged: "The duty of the
physician to disclose, however, is limited to those disclosures which a
reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar
circumstances."" 6
This stipulation is a second reason" 7 why informed consent in
many states has not been a boon to a patient's autonomy. Under the
reasonable physician's standard, should a patient take her doctor to
court, an expert medical witness or expert medical witnesses determine
and testify as to what constitutes reasonable disclosure."8 As a conse-
quence, for a patient to win a civil suit under this standard, she must
persuade another doctor from the community ("community" meaning
the doctor's field) to testify as an expert witness against the alleged
malpracticing peer."9
This requirement immediately puts the woman at a disadvantage.
Given all the deference paid to doctors by the courts, a woman who is
the alleged victim of a wrongful medical practice is already in a
position of weakness in a suit vis-a-vis her doctor. Her position is
weaker still if she is a poor woman, especially of color. One can safely
assume that more often than not, judges and physicians occupy the
same socioeconomic standing, race, and gender. A judge can look at
the woman and her physician and see that the latter is "one of us."
These differences are a tremendous burden for a woman to overcome.
113. See Naanson, 350 P.2d at 1104 (quoting Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181). The court said
with respect to its qualifications: "The instruction given should be modified to in-
form the jury that the physician has such discretion ... 
114. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104.
115. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104.
116. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
117. Recall that the first reason is the Salgo court's granting of undue discretion to physi-
cians in determining what information should be disdosed. See supra notes 108-110
and accompanying text.
118. See Renfer et al., supra note 101, at 412.
119. See Renfer et al., supra note 101, at 412. I use "community" here in the sense of
having the same specialization. The term does not imply geographic limitations, al-
though certainly the more similar the conditions under which the expert worked are
to those under which the defendant doctor worked, the more credible that doctor's
testimony would be.
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Requiring her to secure the testimony of a physician against her
physician, both of whom are from the same "community," only
exacerbates the difficulty of her situation.
Moreover, as Brody points out, instructing physicians to behave
as their colleagues would in a similar situation says nothing about
ethical procedures in medicine.' ° It may be easy for physicians to be-
have in a manner comparable to that of other physicians, but the
question remains: How well do those other physicians behave?2 A
woman is no better off in the Midwestern hospital where doctors were
coercing consent to sterilizations from mostly poor, African-American
women" if her doctor treats her in accordance with the community
standard.
Furthermore, the reasonable physician standard strengthens con-
trol in the hands of the medical community, thereby reinforcing its
paternalistic behavior. When, for example, a doctor fails to tell a
young Puerto Rican woman about alternatives to sterilization," he
knows that, ultimately, it will not be a judge, a jury, or a patient who
determines his ethical and legal standing, but his own peers. In es-
sence, the same medical community whose members have taken
advantage of their positions of power vis-t-vis their patients decides
what is right and wrong in physician-patient interactions.
Other criticisms made regarding the efficacy of the reasonable
physician standard relate directly to why informed consent often fails
women. Katz conceptualizes informed consent as a hybrid: it speaks
both to physician's disclosure obligations as well as patients' willing-
ness to undergo treatment.' 2' However, according to Katz, the law
concerning this dual requirement places too much emphasis on con-
sent at the expense of disclosure.' 2' As a consequence, the law leaves
the patient's body up in the air, exacerbating the harmfulness of the
common notion in medicine that ownership of the body is temporar-
ily transferred to the doctor's discretion. 
2
120. See Brody, supra note 85, at 6.
121. See KAz, supra note 3, at 69-70.
122. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
124. See KAiZ, supra note 3, at 70-71.
125. See KAtz, supra note 3, at 69-71.
126. See KTz, supra note 3, at 59-84.
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Ruth Faben and Tom Beauchamp have also been critical of where
the "ownership of the body" lies." They describe the primacy of pa-
tient autonomy in the doctor-patient relationship as still being a
"novel, provocative, and even radical idea" for most physicians." 8 Af-
ter reviewing the history of informed consent, including the time
prior to 1957 when the required consent did not have to be
"informed," Faben and Beauchamp posit that the paternalistic line of
authority between doctor and patient continues to reign, with little
change, if at all." 9 Wendy Margolis concurs with them, implicating
the legal system. She argues that "[d]espite [the court's] frequent
proclamations of the patient's right to self-determination, the courts
have demonstrated a willingness to defer to the physician's judgment
of what is best for the patient."1
30
Stephen Wear is less critical of medical paternalism but no kinder
to informed consent law. He asserts that the legal requirements for
informed consent give too little attention to the patient, minimizing
the importance of how she evaluates the information disclosed.' This
criticism is particularly significant given that many in the medical
profession believe that a patient on average remembers just thirty-
seven to fifty percent of the information the physician imparts to her
in a typical consultation." 2 Wear goes on to say that informed consent
law gives insufficient ethical guidance concerning what can
satisfactorily be deemed informed consent and instead highlights only
obvious and blatant assaults.
3
The above criticisms of informed consent law under the reason-
able physician standard-that it reinforces medical paternalism, that it
gives deference to the medical community, that it provides no ethical
guidelines for the doctor-patient relationship-are important to all
127. See RUTH R. FaEN & TOM L BEucHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT (1986).
128. FABEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 127, at 75.
129. See FABEN & BEAuCHAMP, supra note 127, at 100.
130. Wendy M. Margolis, Comment, The Doctor Knows Best?.: Patient Capadty r Health
Care Decisionmaking, 71 OR. L REv. 909, 917 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
131. See STEPHEN WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT. PATIENT AUTONOMY AND PHYSICIAN BE-
NEFICENCE WITHIN CLINICAL MEDICINE 14 (1993).
132. See Heather Draper, Steriization Abuse: Women and Consent to Treatment, in PRO-
TECTING THE VULNERABLE: AUTNoNMY AND CONSENT IN HE.4a CAM 77, 81
(Margaret Brazier & Mary Lobjoit eds., 1991) (citing P. Ley, Toward Better Doctor-
Patient Communication, in COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DoroTRs AND PATIENTS 85
(A.E. Bennett ed., 1976)).
133. See WEAR, supra note 131, at 14.
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patients, especially given the long history of individual rights in West-
ern tradition."3 Women often confront a far greater harm than
weakened individual autonomy, however, when they enter a hospital
or doctor's office.'35 For these women, interactions with doctors can
be a threat to their reproductive health. By deferring to the judgment
of the medical community in informed consent with the reasonable
physician standard, the laws in most states not only reinforce the pa-
ternalism of the priestly model of medicine but also increase the
likelihood that in this unequal situation a patient will be taken ad-
vantage of to her detriment.
C. Cesarean Sections
An examination of the rate of cesarean sections performed unnec-
essarily in the United States suggests that the negative effects on
women of informed consent laws extend beyond sterilizations. Addi-
tionally, the legal sanctioning of physician's virtual disregard for
informed consent through court-ordered cesarean sections provides
another instance in which the law undergirds the priestly model of
medicine. This section addresses both of these assertions.
1. Unnecessary Surgeries
The incidence of cesarean sections in the United States offers
strong support to those who claim the birthing process has undergone
a "medicalization."' The rate of babies delivered by cesarean was four
times higher in 1983 than it was in 1965, climbing from approxi-
mately five to twenty percent."3 More recent figures suggest that this
134. For a broad discussion of the evolution of individual freedom in the West, see Gerald
Sirkin, The Future of Government Regulation and Freedom, in THE FuTrraE OF OUR
IIaBERMs: PERsPEcTVEs ON THE BiLL op RIGHTS 77 (Stephen C. Halpern ed.,
1982).
135. See supra Part IIA. for a discussion of the health risks associated with sterilization.
136. See generally HAnUSON, supra note 20.
137. See Selma M. Taffel et al., One Fifth of 1983 U.S. Births by Cesarean Section, 75 Am.
J. PuB. HEATHm 190 (1985) (citing data from National Center for Health Statistics);
see also Rose Weitz & Deborah A. Sullivan, The Politics of Childbirth: The Re-
emergence ofMidwifery in Arizona, 33 Soc. PROBS. 163, 165 (1986).
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proportion has continued its ascendancy, reaching almost twenty-four
percent of all births in 1990.1
A high incidence of cesarean sections is not in itself cause for
concern. If the more frequent performance of this surgery leads to
better medical outcomes, then increases in cesarean sections should be
a welcome improvement to women's health. 9 However, substantial
evidence questions the causal relationship between more cesarean
births and better health. Some argue that many cesareans may be
performed for reasons not related to whether either the mother or the
newborn benefit.4 Other estimates suggest that between thirty and
seventy-seven percent of all cesarean sections performed are unneces-
sary. Even if we accept the most conservative figure of thirty
percent, that would mean that nearly 300,000 cesarean sections are
unnecessarily performed in the United States in a given year. 42 These
are performed due to factors involving characteristics of delivery sys-
tems, physicians, and childbearing Women.
Related studies support the verity of this claim. Consider that
among hospitals and physicians there are a broad range of docu-
mented cesarean birth rates, ranging from zero to more than fifty
percent. 43 In he absence of unnecessary operations, one would as-
sume that these differences might be due to varying risks existing
among the women and children receiving services: the more women
and children at risk, the greater the probability that physicians would
perform cesarean sections. Multiple studies demonstrate that in fact,
138. See Carol Sakala, Midwifery Care and Out-of-Hospital Birth Settings: Do They Reduce
Unnecessary Cesarean Section Births, 37 Soc. SCI. MED. 1233, 1233 (1993) (citing
E.J. Graves, Summary: National Hospital Dcharge Survey, 210 ADv. DATA VrrAL
HPALTm STAT. 1-12 (1992)).
139. Results of one study seemed to indicate that the woman's condition was of less im-
portance in determining whether she would have a cesarean section than was her
physician's practice pattern. The variability in cesarean section rates ranged from
19.1% to 42.3%. See G.L Goyert et al., The Physidan Factor in Cesarean Birth Rates,
320 Naw ENG. J. MED. 706 (1989).
140. See generally Goyert, supra note 139.
141. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1233. This percentage comes from Sakala's numeric
estimate of unnecessary cesarean sections per year (290,000 to 731,000) which she
bases on studies by the U.S. Department of Health's estimation that the attainable
rate of cesarean section is 6% to 16.5%.
142. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1233.
143. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1235 (citing L SILVER & S.M. WOLFE, PuIc CzEN
H.Am RxSi.Es cH GRouP, UNNEcEssARY CsA1,EAsN SEcrnoNs: A RAPIDLY GROW-
IN NA-ONAL EPIDEMIC (1989)).
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however, this variation very often is not positively correlated with the
risk status of the women and newborns involved in the procedure.'"
International comparisons also bring cesarean rates in the United
States under suspicion. Vis-h-vis other nations, the United States
sometimes has higher rates of cesarean births without a correspond-
ingly lower perinatal mortality rate.' In Great Britain, the cesarean
sections are performed at a rate of roughly twelve percent,""6 about
half that of the United States,'47 while its perinatal mortality rate of
eight per 1,000 live births'48 is 1.6 percentage points less than that of
the United States."19 Similarly, the Netherlands has a cesarean section
rate hovering around five percent" with a corresponding perinatal
mortality rate of just 6.5 percent.151
There appears to be an unusually high rate at which physicians in
the United States perform cesarean sections. While "known" and
agreed obstetric indications suggest that a rate of six to eight percent
would be adequate,' "the current rate of cesarean sections-just
about 24 [percent] of all births-is too high."'" This gap between
normative and positive rates, as with hysterectomies, suggests that
physicians too often take advantage of the paternalistic power afforded
to them to the detriment of women's autonomy.'54
144. See, e.g., Mary C. Brucker & Maggie Muellener, Nurse-Midwifery Care of Adolercents,
30 J. NURsE-MIWIFERY 277, 279 (1985); Elizabeth Feldman & Marsha Hurst,
Outcomes and Procedures in Low Risk Birth: A Comparison ofHospital and Birth Center
Settings, 14 BIRTH 18-24 (1987); Wenda R. Trevathan, Childbirth in a Bicultural
Community: Attitudinal and Behavior Variation, in CHILDBIRTH IN AMERUCtA AN-
THROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 216, 217 (Karen L Michaelson ed., 1988).
145. See Colin Francome & Wendy Savage, Cesarean Section in Britain and the United
States 12% or 24%: Is Either the Right Rate?, 37 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1199, 1199
(1993).
146. See Francome & Savage, supra note 145, at 1199.
147. See Alice K. LoCiero, Explaining Excessive Rates of Cesareans and Other Childbirth
Interventions: Contributions From Contemporary Theories of Gender and Psychosocial
Development, 37 Soc. Sc. & MED. 1261 (1993).
148. All perinatal mortality rates given are from 1989. See Francome & Savage, supra note
145, at 1199.
149. See Francome & Savage, supra note 145, at 1200-01.
150. See Francome & Savage, supra note 145, at 1200.
151. See Francome & Savage, supra note 145, tbl.9 at 1212.
152. Francome & Savage, supra note 145, at 1199.
153. LoCiero, supra note 147, at 1261.
154. Performing a cesarean may be easier for the physician and may be used by physicians to
make the birthing process easier fbr themselves. See generally HARRIsoN, supra note 20.
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At issue is not just women's control over their health, but also
their health itself. The risk of death to the mother is four times greater
for cesarean sections than for vaginal births.' Also, one-third of
women develop infections subsequent to cesarean birth."6 Moreover,
incurring these risks usually means incurring them multiple times be-
cause cesarean sections increase the likelihood that later births will
require a cesarean section. 7
2. Forced Cesarean Sections, Race, and Class
Despite the considerable rate at which cesarean sections are
performed in the United States,' not all women agree with the use of
this birthing method.'59 However, failure to gain the consent of those
women opposed to cesarean births has not deterred the medical
community from attempting to make use of this surgical procedure,
especially in "treating" low income women and women of color. 60
Increasingly, physicians and hospitals are challenging a woman
patient's refusal to consent by seeking court orders to carry out the
16I
surgery.
A number of state statutes are relevant to the issue of court or-
dered cesareans 6' and lend to it conflicting resolutions. The Supreme
155. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergency of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 C,&. L Ray. 1951, 1958 (1986). See also Sakala, supra note
138, at 1234 (stating that cesarean sections are associated with increased mortality
rates for the mother as well as a greater probability of many morbid conditions in
both mother and infant). Of course, these rates may be influenced by the fact that
more high risk pregnancies are delivered by cesarean sections.
156. See Helen J. Marieskind, Cesarean Section, 7 WOMEN & Ha.TH 179, 186 (1982)
(citing R.S. Gibbs et al., The Effect of Internal Fetal Monitoring on Maternal Infection
Following Cesarean Section, 48 OBsT mTcs & GYNECOLOGY 653-58 (1976)).
157. See Marieskind, supra note 156, at 186.
158. See supra notes 145-153 and accompanying text.
159. Some women refuse to undergo cesarean secti6ns because this procedure violates their
religious principles. See, e.g., In re Madyun Fetus, 114 DAILY WAsH. L REp. 2233,
2239 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1986).
160. See Deborah J. Krauss, Note, Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal
Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HA~v. C.R.-C.L L.
Rav. 523 (1991).
161. See Krauss, supra note 160, at 529.
162. For a thorough discussion of these laws; see Charity Scott, Resisting the Temptation to
Turn Medical Recommendations into Judicial Orders: A Reconsideration of Court-
Ordered Surgeryfor Pregnant Women, 10 GA. ST. U. L. Rav. 615 (1994).
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Court,163 like most state courts,'" has recognized a patient's right to
refuse treatment. This right is conditioned, however, on the absence
of conflicting state interests. 65 These interests include the preservation
of life, the protection of third parties, the prevention of suicide, and
the preservation of the medical profession's ethical integrity.'" Of
these, all but the prevention of suicide is used to justify court ordered
cesarean sectons.'67 The Supreme Court has held that a state can as-
sert a "compelling interest" in the viable fetus's potential life. 6'
However, this interest is subordinate to the woman's health and life. 69
In addition to the concern about a woman's health and life, there
are other reasons why we should pause before condoning court-
ordered cesarean sections. First and perhaps most obviously, court-
ordered surgeries violate women's autonomy.' 70 The American Medi-
cal Association has said that judicial interventions are appropriate only
if the procedure does not violate the "bodily integrity" of the
woman. 7' Another reason to oppose court-ordered cesarean sections,
163. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
164. See Scott, supra note 162, at 621-22.
165. See Scott, supra note 162, at 621-22.
166. See Superintendent of Bechertoum State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977). See generally Rhoden, supra note 155, at 1971 (discussing the weight
given to these state interests).
167. See Scott, supra note 162, at 631-40.
168. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see alo
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986); Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
169. See PlannedParenthood ofSoutheastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833.
170. See Scott, supra note 162, at 641 (citing American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists (ACOG) Comm. on Ethics Op. No. 55, PATImNT CHoicE: MATERNAL-
FLrrA CONrUCT (Oct. 1987)).
171. Scott, supra note 162, at 641. Scott provides the American Medical Association's
statement:
Judicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an in-
formed refusal of a medical treatment designed to benefit her fetus. If an
exceptional circumstance could be found in which a medical treatment
poses an insignificant or no health risk to the woman, entails a minimal in-
vasion of her bodily integrity, and would dearly prevent substantial and
irreversible harm to her fetus, it might be appropriate for a physician to
seek judicial intervention. However, the findamental principle against
compelled medical procedures should control in all cases that do not pres-
ent such exceptional circumstances.
Scott, supra note 162, at 641 (citing Board of Trustees Report, AMA, Legal Interven-
tions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2670 (1990)).
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and the physical violence that they sometimes entail,'72 is the idea that
a woman's bodily integrity can almost never be protected under such
circumstances. In one example quoted in the medical literature, a Ni-
gerian woman in Chicago did not want a cesarean birth for religious
reasons.173 After obtaining a court order without the knowledge of ei-
ther the patient or her husband, "hospital staff violently fastened her
to the hospital bed and forcibly removed her husband from the deliv-
ery room so that the surgery could be performed." 74
After a more thorough review of the arguments for and against
judicial intervention into cesarean sections, the debate may be judged
a legal stalemate. Scott says, "[b]oth sides can confidently point to tort
law, criminal law, family law, and constitutional law to support-as
well as to refute-the presence or absence of judicial authority to
compel unwanted surgery."' 7' One might suppose that the ambivalent
nature of the legal guidelines to court-ordered surgeries would cause
judges to pause in sanctioning these surgeries. In addition, the high
rate of unnecessary cesarean sections' 76-which suggests that doctors
often are wrong about the dangers of vaginal delivery-implies that
judges might actually be averse to granting these court orders."'7 The
evidence runs counter to both of these suppositions, however. Judges
do not merely sometimes permit doctors to perform cesarean sections
against a woman's consent; they almost always do. 78 Relying solely on
Scott adds that the only "exceptional circumstance" cited by the report was a
hypothetical case in which a woman would refuse to orally take a drug innocuous to
her and beneficial to the fetus. Scott, supra note 162, at 641 n.1 17.
172. See Krauss, supra note 160, at 539. "Enforcement of court-ordered treatment can be
accomplished only through physical force, such as bodily restraint and involuntary
anesthesia, actions that 'surely give one pause in a civilized society.'" (quoting In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 n.8 (D.C. 1990)).
173. See Krauss, supra note 160, at 532.
174. Krauss, supra note 160, at 532.
175. Scott, supra note 162, at 650.
176. Seesupra Part II.C.1.
177. See supra Part II.C.1.
178. See Eric M. Levin, The Constitudonality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Thresh-
old Quesion, 4 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TEcH. 229, 240 (1994) (averring that "[i]n most
instances" the lower courts consent to a physician's wishes for a court ordered cesar-
ean section); see also Krauss, supra note 160, at 538 (noting that judges "almost
always" grant the court ordered cesarean section); Scott, supra note 162, at 618 ("In
most cases where a court order has been sought, a court order has been granted").
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the physician's recommendation," courts often force a woman "to go
under the knife" at her physician's request, transferring control of her
body to her doctor. This type of judicial intervention further legiti-
mizes the priestly model of medicine.
Reinforcing the paternalistic role of the doctor with respect to
determining both the need and the desirability of cesarean births is
especially significant because of the manner in which race and class
influence this issue. Overall cesarean rates do not differ significantly
by race. 8' Additionally, the cesarean birth rate actually rises with in-
creases in educational attainment' and social class." However, as
with coerced sterilizations, low income women of color are the ones
most often involved in court-ordered cesarean sections.' In fact,
Nancy Ehrenreich argues that forced cesarean sections are replacing
coerced sterilizations as a principal means by which the legal and
medical communities assert coercive control over the reproductive and
sexual behavior of women of color.8 4
A study reported in the New England Journal ofMedicine' lends
strong statistical evidence to this claim. Veronica Kolder et al. sur-
veyed medical institutions in forty-five states and the District of
Columbia and obtained detailed descriptions of the court orders for
obstetrical intervention that had been sought by these institutions over
a five-year period.'86 Of those court orders obtained, more than eighty
percent involved African-American, Asian, or Latina women.'"
179. See Scott, supra note 162, at 618-19 (explaining that for most of the cases, there is
no official report in the state case digests and stating "that in most cases where a court
order has been sought, a court order has been granted").
180. See Selma Taffel, Cesarean Delivery in the United States, 1990, in VrrAL AND HEALTH
STAnsir-cs, at 2 (U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Series 21, No. 51, 1994).
(Cesarean rates among African-American and white women are 22.1% and 23.0% re-
spectively. Most other ethnicities and races have rates no higher than 23%.)
181. See Taffel, supra note 180, at 5 (asserting women with 12 years of education or more
are 30% to 40% more likely to have a cesarean section as are those with educational
attainments of nine years or less).
182. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1235.
183. See Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 517 ("the majority of those subjected to court-
ordered surgery are non-white women, many of them immigrants and refugees"); see
aio Krauss, supra note 160, at 523 (noting that court-ordered cesarean sections
"occur disproportionately in cases involving low-income women of color").
184. See Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 516-17.
185. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1192 (1987).
186. SeeKolderet al., supra note 185, at 1192.
187. See Kolder et al., supra note 185, at 1192.
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This disproportionate impact of court-ordered cesarean sections
by race and class is especially significant for two reasons. First, by
threatening low-income women's birthing process with legal action,
court-ordered surgeries may deter those most in need of prenatal care
from seeking it. 8' Two examples illustrate this; Barbara Jean Jeffries, a
low-income African-American woman who objected to cesarean births
on religious grounds, went into hiding and gave birth naturally after
learning she would have to undergo this surgical procedure." 9 Another
woman of the same race and class, upon learning that a cesarean sec-
tion would be likely, never returned to the hospital and gave birth at
home.190
Second, any cesarean birth, whether court-ordered or not, will
not affect all women in the same manner. Because the children of low-
income women and women of color are more likely to be born with
low birth weight and/or prematurely, the complications of cesarean
birth are exacerbated for him or her.'9'
The legal and medical issues surrounding cesarean sections illus-
trate well the diverse impact of the priestly model of medicine among
women. It is clear that unnecessary cesarean sections-a detriment to
women's health, autonomy, and even pbcketbooks-affect all women.
The negative impact of court-ordered cesarean section procedures is,
however, disproportionately concentrated on low-income women and
women of color.
Ehrenreich attempts to capture the dynamics of this differential
treatment by suggesting divergent metaphorical constructs for different
women. 192 Affluent European-American women are characterized as the
"good girls" who obey their doctors' orders in taking seriously their "role
as selfless nurturers."'9" For them, disobedience might be a sign of a "bad"
mother.'94 On the other hand, there are the "outsider" women-those
women that are low-income, of color, or both.'95 Many doctors consider
these women stubborn, recalcitrant, and in need of reform.'96
188. See Krauss, supra note 160, at 523.
189. See Krauss, supra note 160, at 538.
190. See Krauss, supra note 160, at 538.
191. SeeKrauss, supra note 160, at 530.
192. See Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 531.
193. Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 531.
194. See Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 531.
195. See Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 495.
196. See Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 513, 521.
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Altering these metaphorical constructs can be enlightening with
respect to cesarean sections under the priestly model of medicine. In
his paternalistic role, the doctor presumably has his favorite
"children," which are likely to be from a similar racial and socioeco-
nomic background-i.e., middle- to upper-income European-
American women. His orders to these women are most often dutifully
followed. At the same time, the paternalistic doctor has "children" not
so highly prized-low-income women of color-who he believes are
in need of discipline. Indeed, when a low-income woman of color re-
fuses to undergo a cesarean section, these roles manifest themselves.
"Father," or doctor, goes to a judge to obtain the means for the neces-
sary corrections. In granting court-ordered obstetrical interventions,
the law legitimizes these roles and sides with the "father." Addition-
ally, as we shall see in the next section, the law also hinders women's
attempts to avoid these detrimental situations altogether.
D. Midwifery
In turn of the century Massachusetts, Hannah Porn was a mid-
wife who served an immigrant clientele mainly from Finland and
Sweden.'97 Ms. Porn performed her services more than adequately; the
neonatality rates of births attended by her were less than half those of
births attended by local physicians.'98 Nonetheless, after a suit brought
in 1907 Ms. Porn and other midwives in Massachusetts were no
longer permitted to practice midwifery.'99
Hannah Porn's story is an all too familiar one in the history of
midwifery in the United States. Despite its providing numerous
benefits to women, including the opportunity to circumvent the
above-mentioned problems associated with caesarean sections under
the priestly model of medicine, midwifery has been severely limited by
the medical and legal communities in its scope, and consequently in
its effectiveness. This stifling of midwifery's practice reinforces
medical paternalism, or at least leaves it unchecked.
197. See Eugene R. Dedercq, The Trials of Hanna Porn: The Campaign to Abolish Mid-
wiqfry in Massachusetts, 84 AM. J. PuB. HLmTH 1022, 1023 (1994) [hereinafter
Dedercq, Hanna Porn].
198. See Dedercq, Hanna Porn, supra note 197, at 1025.
199. See Dedercq, Hanna Porn, supra note 197, at 1022-23.
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1. Potential Positive Benefits of Midwifery
In its various manifestations,"° midwifery appears to provide care
superior to that provided by doctors in many respects, the most nota-
ble of which is the lesser use of cesarean sections. In a nation in which
some would assert this surgical procedure is generally used superflu-
ously, births attended by midwives depart dramatically from the norm
as evidenced by a series of carefully matched or adjusted cohort studies
of women's birthing experiences.20' Those women who began labor
with a midwife or in an out-of-hospital setting or both had cesarean
rates at least forty-three percent and as much as ninety-one percent
lower than women who used doctors and hospitals.02
The practice of midwifery provides other benefits as well. When
midwives are used to assist births, low birth weight babies 3 are born
with a periodicity less than half that of the general rate.2 4 Also, mid-
wife-attended births are associated with low neonatal mortality rates.2 5
In the five European countries with the lowest infant mortality rates,
200. Midwives are commonly classified as either "nurse midwives" or "lay midwives." See
infra notes 244-254 and accompanying text (describing key differences between
these two types).
201. See Gigliola Baruf i et al., Patterns of Obstetric Procedures Ue in Maternity Care, 64
OBSTETRCS & GYNECOLOGY 493 (1984); Gigliola Baruffi et al., A Study ofPregnancy
Outcomes in a Maternity Center and a Tertiary Care Hospital, 74 Am. J. Pua. HEaT
973 (1984); A. Mark Durand, The Safety of Home Birth: The Farm Study, 82 AM. J.
PUB. HALTI 450 (1992); Elizabeth Feldman & Marsha Hurst, Outcomes and Proce-
dures in Low Risk Birth: A Comparison ofHospitaland Birth Center Settings, 14 BIRTH
18 (1987); Lewis Mehl & Gail Peterson, Home Birth Versus Hospital Birth: Com-
parisons of Outcomes of Matched Populations, in PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, AND
PARNmTOOD 315 (Paul Ahmed ed., 1981); Anne Scupholme er al., A Birth Center
Affiliated with the Tertiary Care Center: Comparison of Outcome, 67 OBSmTRICS &
GYNEcoLOGY. 598 (1986).
202. See Archie Brodsky, Home Delivery: Midwivery Work. So Should Midwives., 23 REA-
SON 28, 31 (Mar. 1992). A 1991 study by the National Birth Center Study supports
these findings. Nearly 12,000 women were admitted into "freestanding" birth centers
in the United States, three-fourths of which are operated by midwives. The subse-
quent cesarean section rate was just 4.4%.
203. Low birthweight babies are those weighing less than 2,500 grams at birth. See Eugene
P. Dedercq, The Transfirmation of American Midwifery: 1975 to 1988, 82 AM. J.
PUB. HEaT 680, 681 (1992)[hereinafter Dedercq, Transfrrmation]. Declercq bases
this figure on his analysis of birth certificate data from the Natality, Marriage and Di-
vorce Statistics Branch of the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for
Disease Control. See Declercq, Transfrrmation, supra at 681.
204. See Dedercq, Transfirmation, supra note 203, at 681.
205. See Dedercq, Transformation, supra note 203, at 680.
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seventy percent of all births are assisted by midwives.206 Moreover,
midwifery has had overall good effects for the urban poor. One-third
of the clientele at North Central Bronx Hospital midwifery service is
classified as high risk.2 7 Yet, the hospital has not only the lowest ce-
sarean rate in New York City but lower-than-average rates of low
birth weight and perinatal and neonatal mortality rates as well.
28
The positive contributions that midwifery can make to the
birthing experience have not gone unnoticed. As early as 1925, a
'White House conference on child health acclaimed the merits of
midwifery, citing not only this practice's better record vis-h-vis physi-
cians, but also the superior care that it provides the child-bearing
woman.'o More recently, a number of prestigious institutions in-cludng t  W rld ealh "" . .210
cluding the World Health Organization and the American Public
Health Association2 1' have called for widespread implementation of
midwifery care practices.2 Even some obstetricians have given mid-
wifery ringing endorsements, including a Dutch obstetrician who
206. See Caroline Hall Otis, Midwives Still Hassled By Medical Establishment, UTNE
READER, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 32, 34. A "real-life experiment" in Modera County,
California provides further support. In 1960, nurse-midwives were introduced into a
poor agricultural area in which the mortality rate was 24 per 1,000, and the rate sub-
sequently dropped to 10 per 1,000. After pressure from the state medical association
ended the program in 1963 and obstetricians returned, the rate ascended to 32 per
1,000. See Brodsky, supra note 202, at 31.
207. See Brodsky, supra note 202, at 31.
208. See Brodsky, supra note 202, at 31. New Mexico Department of Health statistics
compiled from 1981 to 1990 illustrate the difference that midwives can make. Dur-
ing the years midwives attended births, women had lower episiotomy (5.1 per 1000
compared to "nearly routine"), cesarean (2.2-8.17 per 1000 compared to 15-25 per
1000), and perinatal mortality (5.2 per 1000 compared to 11.3 per 1000) rates than
obstetricians and physicians. Reported in Sharon Bloyd-Peshkin Midwifery: Offto A
GoodStart, 184 VEGETARAN Timas 69 (1992).
209. See Judith P. Rooks, Nurse-Midwifery: The Window is Wide Open, 90 Am. J. Nuns-
ING 30, 31 (1990)(stating that for normal delivery the record of trained midwives
surpasses that of physicians); see also Julius Levy, Maternal Mortality in the First
Month of Life in Relation to Attendant at Birth, 13 AM. J. PuB. HEATH 88, 90-91
(1923)(claiming that the lowest maternal mortality rates were in the localities with
the highest percentage of midwife-attended births).
210. See Brodsky, supra note 202, at 33.
211. See Brodsky, supra note 202, at 33.
212. See Brodsky, supra note 202, at 33. Institutions which suggest the same practice are
the European Economic Community, the Institute of Medicine, the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, the General Accounting Office, the National Commission to
Prevent Infant Mortality, the Women's Institute for Childbearing Policy, the Na-
tional Women's Health Network, the National Black Women's Health Project, and
the Boston Women's Health Book Collective. See Brodsky, supra note 202, at 33.
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praised midwives for promoting women's self-confidence and self-
213respect.
The sources of this positive recognition include mothers as well.
Increases in quantity of midwife-attended births express at least some
women's approval of midwifery. Of all births, the rate of those in
which a midwife was the primary caregiver nearly quadrupled from
197514 to 1988.5 Additionally, statistics show that in 1989 midwives
assisted in two and one-half times the number of births attended by
them in 1975.
The cause of this development renders it especially significant.
217Increasingly women have come to mistrust the medical profession,
and along with that mistrust have come to question the medical
domination of the childbirth process. 2 No longer relying on the os-
tensible wisdom of physicians, many women demand the right to
choose the place of birth as well as the birth practitioner. 21' Desiring a
more natural and women-centered birthing experience,/n these
213. Obstetrician G.J. Kloosterman comments on a home birth setting, generally the do-
main of a midwife:
The advantages of home confinements are that in her own home the ex-
pectant mother is not considered a patient, but a woman, fulfilling a
natural and highly personal task. She is the real center around which eve-
rything (and everybody) revolves. The midwife or doctor and the maternity
aide nurse are all her guests, there to assist her. This setting reinforces her
self-respect and self-confidence.
Brodsky, supra note 202, at 30.
214. See Dedercq, Transfirmation, supra note 203, at 680. Midwives attended 0.9% of all
births in 1975. See Dedercq, Transformation, supra note 203, at 680 (citing U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Advance Report of Final Natality Statistics, 1988,
40 MoHmLY VrrAL STAT. REP. 39 (Suppl. 1990)).
215. See Jennifer D. Parker, Ethnic Differences in Midwife-Attended U.S. Births, 84 AM. J.
PUB. HEa.T 1139, 1140 (1994) (stating midwives attended 3.99% of all births in
1988). Parker's figure derives from her examination of a sample population of natal-
ity files compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics. Parker, supra at 1139.
216. See Parker, supra note 215, at 1139. Midwives attended 150,000 births in 1989
compared to 60,000 a decade earlier. See Parker, supra note 215, at 1139 (citing U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Advance Report ofFinalNatality Statistics, 1989, 40
Mom=.Y VrrAL STAT. REP. 1 (1991) and U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv.,
Midwife and Out-of-Hospital Deliveries: United States, 21 VrrAL HE.AH STAT. 21
(1984)).
217. See Rooks, supra note 209, at 33-34.
218. See Irene H. Butter & Bonnie J. Kay, State Laws and the Practice of Lay Midwifery, 78
AM. J. PuB. HE.L 1161, 1161 (1988).
219. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1161.
220. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1161.
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women turn to midwives in asserting these rights. This turn appears to
reflect women's interest in moving away from the medical domination
of "normal" childbirth and towards an experience in which they have
more substantive control as childbearers.
2. The Marriage of Law and Medicine
in the Suppression of Midwifery
Notwithstanding the positive effect it can have on women's
health care as well as its substantive support from both important
health organizations and a good portion of women, midwifery has
been the object of scathing attacks and suppression for nearly a cen-
tury. The suit brought against Hannah Pon 22' was part of a larger
turn of the century campaign to abolish midwifery.2 In the move to
end its practice, midwifery's critics were not only unusually vitupera-
tive but racist as well. Critics described midwifery as "filthy and
ignorant and not far removed from the jungles of Africa' 223 and as "a
relic of barbarism." 224 This biting rhetoric apparently did not fall on
deaf ears: midwifery's share of births fell from almost half in 1900 to
one-eighth in 1935.225
Judy Litoff argues that the virtual demise of midwifery in the
early 1900s was due in large part to the campaign successfully led by
obstetric specialists to redefine birth as dangerous, birth attendance as
a scientific process, and midwives as dangerously unskilled.2" The
motivation for this campaign might explain more about why the sup-
pression of midwifery continues.2m  Litoff suggests that the
obstetricians recognized that women's continued success as midwives
(because they were untrained in the medical sciences) would prevent
those with specialized skill and knowledge such as themselves from
enjoying "due recognition. " 2
221. Commonwealth v. Porn, 82 N.E. 31 (Mass. 1907).
222. See Declercq, Hanna Porn, supra note 197, at 1022.
223. Neal Devitt, The Statistical Case ftr the Elimination of the Midwife. Fact versus Preju-
dice, 1890-1935 (Part i), 4 WOMEN & HEALTH 81, 89 (1979).
224. Devitt, supra note 223, at 89.
225. See Devitt, supra note 223, at 81-82.
226. See JUDY B. LrroFP, AMERICAN MIDwIvES, i86o TO THE PRESENT 64-83 (1978).
227. See infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text (discussing tactics employed by the
medical community to suppress lay midwifery).
228. LrroFF, supra note 226, at 64.
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Cynthia Watchorn follows Litoff in a broader sense, tying the
motivation for ending midwifery to issues of class and gender. " She
argues that as the all-male medical field made significant gains in
power, prestige, and money, doctors wanted to eliminate or at least
marginalize those practicing medicine who did not hold a class posi-
tion comparable to that of most in the medical field." Such an
exclusion included midwives.2I
As the continuum of history melts into the present, the still
largely male obstetrics field" ' continues not just to slight the merits of
midwifery but to demonize it as well. For example, the growth of
midwife-assisted home births in Arizona has met substantial opposi-
tion from physicians and hospitals. One physician refused to provide
any care to a woman considering home delivery."S Additionally, some
hospital personnel reportedly tell mothers that "home birth is akin to
walking across the street blindfolded."2m Going beyond these hospital
personnel's condemnation, the president of the American College of
Obstetrics has likened home birth to child abuse.2"
Important to the viability of midwifery is the fact that these
scathing attacks are little more than rhetorical. In a study of contem-
porary court cases against midwives, the plaintiff typically was not a
patient, as one might expect, but rather a physician!"6 Interestingly, it
was not patients who were dissatisfied with midwives' services. Besides
demonstrating that obstetricians are men of action as well as words,
some researchers suggest that the medical community's attempt to
stifle midwifery, in its turn of the century campaign, is motivated
229. See Cynthia Watchorn, Midwifery: A Hitory of Statutory Suppression, 9 GOLN
GATE U. L REv. 631, 632-33 (1978-1979)..
230. See Watchorn, supra note 229, at 633-36.
231. See Watchorn, supra note 229, at 633--36.
232. See AMERicAN MEDICA. ASSOCIATION, supra note 14, at 50, 52. While no data ate
available for obstetricians alone, the American Medical Association reports that just
9,240 of the 35,619 obstetricians and gynecologists in the United States are female.
SeeAMmucAN MEDICAL AsSOCIAuTiON, supra note 14, at 50, 52.
233. See Weitz & Sullivan, supra note 137, at 170.
234. Weitz & Sullivan, supra note 137, at 171.
235. "Mhe head of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology said, 'Home
birth is child abuse.'" Otis, supra note 206, at 32.
236. See Dedercq, Hanna Porn, supra note 197, at 1023 (citing D. SULLIAN & I WErZ,
LABOR PAINS 18 (1988)).
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more by concern for its own power than by an interest in an expectant
mother's well-being.' 7
Thus, throughout the twentieth century, the mainstream medical
community has painted an extremely negative portrait of midwifery."ss
Significantly, this Mephistopholean portrait's effect extends well into
the legal sphere. Legislators and courts now lend the hand necessary to
transform the bias against midwifery into legal suppression, just as
they did in the incipient stages of the turn of the century campaign
against midwifery- 9
An international comparison begins to support this assertion. In
most industrialized nations, a woman has the right to choose not
only who will be her birthing attendant but where she will give birth
as well.2' In the United States, Canada, and South Africa, however,
women possess neither of these rights."' Possibly as a consequence,
midwives in the United States have yet to achieve a status compara-
ble to that enjoyed by midwives in other countries.24 Additionally,
midwifery as an independent profession has largely been abolished.243
The word "independent" is stressed because midwifery as prac-
ticed in the United States is not isomorphic. There are two basic
types of midwives, nurse2" and lay,4 and their differences are very
important. These midwives each work in different settings. While
the lay midwife almost never has hospital privileges,246 nurse-
midwives work more often in medical institutions. In this setting,
237. See Declercq, Hanna Porn, supra note 197, at 1022-23 (citing LrroFF, supra note
226, at 64).
238. For a thorough review of the mainstream opposition to midwifery during the early
twentieth century, see LrroFa, supra note 226, at 64-90.
239. See supra notes 220-230 and accompanying text.
240. See Otis, supra note 206, at 32.
241. See Otis, supra note 206, at 32.
242. See generaly, Declercq, Hanna Porn, supra note 197, at 1022-23.
243. See Dedercq, Hanna Porn, supra note 197, at 1022 (citing SULLIVAN & W rrz, supra
note 233, at 18).
244. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1161. Certified nurse-midwives are "RNs with
additional training and certification in midwifery ... who usually practice in hospital
settings." Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1161.
245. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1161. A lay midwife is "someone who practices
in a home setting and who has been trained in a variety of ways, often not linked to
formal programs in educational institutions but including substantial clinical training
in apprenticeships." Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1161.
246. See Dedercq, Transformation, supra note 203, at 680 (citing Butter & Kay, supra
note 218).
247. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1236.
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nurse-midwives operate under the control of physicians48 and their
frameworks.2"' In contrast, for lay midwives, the obstetrician is
merely a "back-up." 2 ° To a great extent it appears that nurse-
midwives accept their subordination to the work of physicians, while
lay midwives seek an independent source of legitimacy.25 Carol Sakala
highlights the importance of this distinction in citing the principle
advantage of lay midwifery.252 She writes, this advantage is "the ability
to construct the meaning of birth and to practice maternity care in a
manner that is largely unconstrained by prevailing medical ap-
proaches."211 Indeed, Sakala identifies this form of midwifery as the
autonomous manifestation of the profession (as opposed to nurse-
midwifery), calling it not "lay" but "independent" midwifery.2 4
While the physician-controlled type of midwifery enjoys general
acceptance,255 lay midwifery-removed from the hegemony of the
medical profession and thus the priestly model of medicine-does
not.256 In an interstate comparison of the legal status of lay midwifery,
researchers found that independent midwifery is clearly legal in just
ten states. 2 7 At the same time, it is clearly illegal in ten states and le-
gally ambiguous in thirty others.25 Moreover, in eight of the ten states
in which lay midwifery is legal, it is regulated and monitored by the
department of public health or its equivalent.2. This requirement does
not afford lay midwifery the autonomy possessed by other health oc-
cupations, which have their own regulatory board consisting of their
own members. 26' Thus, even where lay midwifery is legal, most states
248. See Weitz & Sullivan, supra note 137, at 164.
249. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1236.
250. See Weitz & Sullivan, supra note 137, at 164.
251. See Beth Rushing, Ideology in the Reemergence ofNorth American Midwifery, 20 WORK
& OccupAroNs 46, 49-51 (1993).
252. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1237.
253. Sakala, supra, note 138, at 1237. Sakala adds, "These midwives have the opportunity
to develop a women-derived and centered body of knowledge and practice regarding
childbearing that reflects women's subjective experiences, in contrast to externally
imposed obstetrical models." Sakala, supra note 138, at 1237.
254. Sakala, supra note 138, at 1237.
255. See Rooks, supra note 209, at 34 (explaining that in the 1980s, nurse-midwives
gained unprecedented acceptance).
256. Only 2% of United States births each year are attended by lay midwives. See Sakala,
supra note 138, at 1237.
257. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1162.
258. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1162.
259. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1165.
260. See Butter & Kay, supra note 218, at 1165.
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keep its practice subject to the control of the male-doriinated physi-
cian community at least to some extent.
Bombarded with physicians' lobbyists at the turn of the century,
legislators molded the laws to give male physicians control over the
health field.6' Almost a century later, that imperative has changed lit-
tle as legal regulations of maternity care continue to stifle midwifery
practice almost completely.262 Significantly, the marginalization of
midwifery does not appear to be changing. Major policy reports ad-
dressing the rising rate of cesarean births do not give attention to
midwifery's potential to alleviate this problem. 63
The legal suppression of midwifery is especially significant with
respect to race and class. Midwifery could help alleviate the medical
crisis of providing maternity care to poor women and women of color
living in rural areas.2 Between 1982 and 1989, African-American,
Latina, and Native American women were roughly 1.5, 2.5, and 5.5
times, respectively, more likely to have a midwife attend their births
than was a white woman.2' Thus, the legal suppression of midwifery,
to the extent that it hinders the fulfillment of the needs and desires of
poor women, and women of color, also provides another example of
how the legal support of the priestly model of medicine has an espe-
cially deleterious effect upon these groups.
III. PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS
This Article has argued that the priestly model of medicine
dominates physician-patient relationships in a manner detrimental to
women because it violates their autonomy and reinforces societal
stereotypes of them. Also where the negative effects of the medical
community's paternalistic power manifest themselves most conspicu-
ously, in unnecessary and forced operations, the law provides support
261. See Watchorn, supra note 229, at 632-33.
262. See Kerry E. Reilley, Note, Midwifery in America: The Need frr Uniform and Mod-
ernized State Law, 20 SuFFoLK U. L RLv. 1117 (1986) (discussing status of midwife
statutes in all fifty states).
263. See Sakala, supra note 138, at 1235 (pointing out that the low cesarean rate "of U.S.
women using midwifery care and/or out-of-hospital birth settings is often dismissed
as an artifact of self-selection, attributable to the presumed low-risk status of women
using these care arrangements").
264. See Rooks, supra note 209, at 31-32.
265. See Parker, supra note 215, at 1140.
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in a variety of ways, most often to the detriment of low income
women and women of color. In effect, law and medicine are wed in a
matrimony harmful to women's health care as well as their general
autonomy. This final section suggests ways by which the law can di-
vorce itself from this unholy marriage.
A. The Reasonable Patient Standard
The dominance of the reasonable physician standard in guiding
informed consent requirements provides a clear example of how the
law reinforces the priestly model of medicine. This standard not only
gives physicians undue discretion in deciding what they will tell their
patients,'6 it also affords the medical community considerable control
over what can be considered a violation of informed consent law.
67
These attributes of the reasonable physician standard help to create an
environment in which unnecessary and coerced operations not only
can be, but are performed with impunityr.
There is, however, an alternative. The reasonable patient standard
269is more supportive of a patient's control over health care decisions.
This standard was first articulated in Canterbury v. Spence. 0 In this
case, the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to damages for injuries
allegedly caused by the performance of a procedure used to remedy his
ruptured disk.27' The plaintiff charged inter alia that his physician
failed to meet disclosure obligations. While admitting that there was
approximately a one percent risk of paralysis attendant to the surgical
procedure, the physician claimed that the negligible nature of this risk
did not necessitate his telling the patient, especially since disclosure
266. See supra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part II.B.2.
268. For a discussion of informed consent and the reasonable physician standard, see
Thomas K Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion Psychological
Trauma, 71 NoTra DAME L REv. 639, 642-48 (1996).
269. Under the reasonable patient standard, the physician must disclose what the reason-
able patient would deem significant in deciding whether to undergo the proposed
treatment. For an elaboration of what information the reasonable patient might re-
quire doctors to disclose, see Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 411 (La.
1988).
270. Canterburyv. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
271. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776-77.
272. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776.
[Vol. 4:375
THE PRIESTLY MODEL OF MEDICINE
might have unduly alarmed the patient and prompted him not to con-
sent to what the physician deemed to be necessary surgery.'
This justification for nondisclosure enjoys rough support from
Salgo v. Leland. 4 However, the court in Canterbury rejected the
nondisclosure argument's cogency and more generally articulated an
outright repudiation of the reasonable physician standard for
disclosure.2" Instead of being guided by the standard generally
accepted by the medical community, the court stated the extent of
disclosure should be that which enables the patient to make an
"intelligent choice."27 6 Specifically, potential harms must be divulged
to the extent that they possess "materiality to the patient's decision."
277
This means that all risks that might affect a patient's decision must be
disclosed.278
The court altered informed consent law in another significant
way. While expert testimony of physicians is necessary to make a
claim actionable under the reasonable physician standard, this
requirement is no longer the case in the new patient-centered
standard.2' This change alleviates the burden of a patient who believes
she has been harmed by her doctor in seeking a remedy.
273. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 778.
274. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957); see supra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
275. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d. at 786. The court stated:
The duty to disclose, we have reasoned, arises from phenomena apart from
medical custom and practice. The latter, we think, should no more estab-
lish the scope of the duty than its existence. Any definition of scope in
terms purely of a professional standard is at odds with the patient's pre-
rogative to decide on projected therapy himself. That prerogative, we have
said, is at the very foundation of the duty to disclose, and both the patient's
right to know and the physician's correlative obligation to tell him are di-
luted to the extent that its compass is dictated by the medical profession.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786 (citations omitted). The court, based on a concern for
patient autonomy, also stated, "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination
on particular therapy demands a standard set by law fir physicians rather than one
which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at
784 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
276. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.
277. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
278. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
279. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 792. The court stated:
Lay witness testimony can competently establish a physician's failure to
disclose particular risk information, the patient's lack of knowledge of the
risk, and the adverse consequences following the treatment. Experts are
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Also known as the "patient autonomy" standard,"' the reasonable
patient standard is now the guideline for disclosure in seventeen states
and the District of Columbia,"' and should be established in all fifty.
This standard runs counter to physician paternalism under the priestly
model of medicine by making the test of what constitutes proper dis-
closure that which affords a patient the opportunity to make an
intelligent decision, rather than what the medical community thinks
she needs to know. Such a standard permits the patient more substan-
tial control over medical decision-making.
Besides increasing patient autonomy, the reasonable patient stan-
dard will also help alleviate problems discussed above, such as the
performance of unnecessary cesarean sections and sterilizations in
which consent is gained by physician coercion. If women were more
fully informed of the risks associated with these surgeries, then they
might be more likely to forego them. Furthermore, the fact that
plaintiffs do not need expert testimony to win their case under the
patient-centered standard might deter doctors from violating these
stronger disclosure requirements. The state of Washington's codifica-
tion of the reasonable patient standard provides a model for other
states that have not yet moved to this standard. The Washington
Code provides:
unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient's decision
on treatment, or to the reasonably, [sic] expectable effect of risk disclosure
on the decision.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 792 (citations omitted).
280. See Renfer et al., supra note 101, at 412.
281. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784-87 (recognizing that the patient's right of self-
determination requires the standard of physician disclosure to be set by law and
measured by the patient's need); Tm. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (West
Supp. 1977); WsH. Rkv. CODE § 7.70.050(l)-(2) (1996); Korman v. Mallin, 858
P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Alaska, 1993); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972);
Revord v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Percle v. Sr. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289, 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Sard v. Hardy, 379
A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. 1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d
240, 242-44 (Mass. 1982); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn.
1980); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So. 2d 488, 493 (Miss. 1987); Largey v. Rothman, 540
A.2d 504, 508-10 (NJ. 1988); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180, 193-95 (N.M.
1978); Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1973); Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1979); Gerchell v. Mansfield, 489 P.2d
953, 957 (Or. 1971); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650-51 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1971); Wflkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 685-89 (RI. 1972).
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(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof that
injury resulted from health care in a civil negligence case
or arbitration involving the issue of the alleged breach of
the duty to secure an informed consent by a patient or
his representatives against a health care provider:
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the
patient of a material fact or facts relating to the
treatment;
(b) That the patient consented to the treatment without
being aware of or fully informed of such material
fact or facts.
(c) That a reasonable prudent patient under similar cir-
cumstances would not have consented to the
treatment if informed of such material fact or facts;
(d) That the treatment in question proximately caused
injury to the patient.
(2) Under the provisions of this section a fact is defined as
or considered to be a material fact, if a reasonably pru-
dent person in the position of the patient or his
representative would attach significance to it deciding
whether or not to submit to the proposed treatment. 82
B. Forced Surgeries: A Moratorium
While the rate of unnecessary surgeries may decline with im-
provements in informed consent laws, this change does nothing for
court-ordered surgical procedures. Such procedures are approved by
courts and enacted by the medical community with no pretense of
attention to the patient's wishes. That the procedure is court-ordered
indicates that it is done without the consent of the patient and with
the sanction of the law. In the two areas discussed above, forced ster-
ilizations and court-ordered cesarean sections, this Article proposes
that the law's legitimization of the medical community's dominance
of women's bodies should cease. Except in cases where the woman is
physically unable to provide consent, there should be no forced cesar-
ean sections or sterilizations.
282. WASH. REv. CODE § 7,70.050(1)-(2) (1996).
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1. Court-ordered Cesarean Sections
The strongest case can be made against court-ordered cesarean
sections. The high rates of unnecessary cesarean sections suggests
strongly that doctors are not altogether successful at determining
when childbirth intervention is necessary.283 As a consequence, judges
should not be so quick to defer to doctors' medical expertise regarding
the necessity of a cesarean section. To do so very often constitutes le-
gitimizing frequently misguided medical testimony at the expense of
due respect for a woman's health and autonomy.
In re A. C.284 provides courts with a precedent to follow in reject-
ing physician requests to perform court-ordered obstetrical
interventions. In vacating the Superior Court's motion for a stay by a
woman ordered by the court to undergo a cesarean section, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that the woman has the
right to decide what will be done on behalf of herself and her fetus in
"virtually all cases."285 Moreover, in the event that the patient is
"incompetent or otherwise unable to give an informed consent," the
court ruled that her decision is properly ascertained through
"substituted judgement." ns Even substituted judgement, as construed
by the court in this case, respects a woman's right to determine what
will be done with her body. The court stressed the need to probe the
female patient's value system to help determine what she would
choose if she were capable.2 7 Moreover, the court cited the patient's
family, not the doctor, as the "best source" regarding information
about the patient's decision.2"
2. Court-Ordered Sterilizations
The proper course to take in regard to court-ordered sterilization
is far more difficult to chart. Certainly, those statutes that permit
state-ordered involuntary sterilizations of clearly competent persons
should be repealed.28' However, when the sterilization involves one
283. Seesupra Part II.C.1.
284. In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
285. AC., 573 A.2d at 1237.
286. AC., 573 A.2d at 1237.
287. SeeAC., 573 A.2d at 1250.
288. AC., 573 A.2d at 1250.
289. Specifically, such statutes are in place in Idaho and Delaware. Seesupra note 64.
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who is deemed by the court to be incompetent, the issue becomes far
more complicated as questions are raised concerning the ability of the
parent to raise the child, as well as who will bear this burden in the
event that the parents cannot do so. Given the difficulty in distin-
guishing between those who are competent and those who are not
with respect to mental faculties,2' and given the apparent race and
class biases that this paper argues are evident in both the medical and
the legal systems, this Article recommends placing a moratorium on
all forced sterilizations until we not only have studied the abilities of
parents of different perceived competence levels to raise children, but
also have eliminated, or at least weakened, racial and class biases.
C. Mandatory PatientAdvocates
Many of the problems associated with the priestly model of
medicine both stem from and lead to a lack of information on the
part of the female patient. It is often difficult for a patient to make a
truly informed decision, because she lacks the information to do so.
Female patients may have been taught that asking questions implies a
lack of confidence in their doctor, and therefore they simply wait for
the doctor to give them the necessary information.29" ' The doctor then
makes a decision that he feels is best for the patient, often without
giving the patient any real choice. 292
One more radical approach to this problem may be to require
hospitals to provide advocates for women who are scheduled to give
birth. The advocate would accompany the patient during labor and
delivery and could also accompany the woman to her doctor's ap-
pointments during her last month of pregnancy. The role of the
advocate would vary from case to case, depending on the needs of the
patient, but in general, an advocate "interprets, rephrases, ... records
... demands, defends, explains, and acts as a witness." 293 The advocate
is thus a person who is looking out for the patient's interests. The ad-
vocate ensures that the patient understands what is happening to her,
290. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
291. See MAIoN CROOK, My BODY: WoMmN SPEAK Our ABotrr THEIR HE.AxL CARE
87 (1995). Crook writes, "When a woman does not get the information she needs
from her doctor, she often does without the information." CROOK, supra at 88.
292. See CRooK, supra note 291, at 83-86.
293. CROOK, supra note 291, at 87.
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which should allow the patient to make more informed health care
decisions.
Advocates could be drawn from the public health profession. Be-
cause of their health care training, these professionals would be
adequately skilled to understand what the doctor is saying, and they
would be able to communicate this information to the patient. Care-
ful training of advocates would be important so that the advocate
would not fall into a parental or paternal role. Obviously, a patient
would not be required to use the advocate. But making these advo-
cates available, especially for women who are not well-educated,
would go a long way toward ensuring that women's decisions with
regard to matters such as hysterectomies and cesareans are made under
conditions that are more likely to result in a truly informed choice.
D. Midwifery
The promotion of midwifery care seems to offer another method
of reducing not only unnecessary and forced surgeries, but also the
extent to which male doctors possess hegemonic control over women's
health care. Besides yielding substantially lower rates of unnecessary
medical interventions,29' midwifery care in many instances effects a
more woman-centered birthing experience.2 This is especially true of
lay midwifery, the type of midwifery care stifled most by the law.2G
To both reduce the rate of unnecessarily performed and forced sur-
geries, as well as more generally to afford women greater autonomy
and respect in the childbirthing process, we should enact legal reform
that makes lay midwifery legal in all fifty states. Such reform could
come in the form of national protective legislation for this practice.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a number of reforms: mandated use of a
reasonable patient standard for informed consent; a moratorium on
forced sterilizations; the mandatory provision of patient advocates by
hospitals; and enactment of national protective legislation for lay
294. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
296. Seesupra Part II.D.2.
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midwifery. These reforms would go a long way toward reducing the
hegemony of the priestly model of medicine. Such a reduction of the
dominance of this model would in turn increase the autonomy of
women in our society and decrease the medical risks to which they are
subjected. t

